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Containing twelve scenarios for the world in 2030, this 
booklet offers insights into how the EU can maintain 
and build up its capacity to act in the face of the ma-
jor disruptive changes that are likely to come over this 
decade. It is being released in the run-up to German 
elections in September 2021 that will serve as a kind 
of referendum on ten years of government-heavy cri-
sis management. We present three scenarios for each 
of four global phenomena that we have chosen for 
their potential to change European society within a 
single generation. These are fields that will structure 
international affairs and can be used by states and 
nations to transform one another:
 - New digital technologies 
 -  Emerging security threats such as climate change 
 - Geo-economics (trade and system competition)
 - Large-scale migration 
The scenarios are in large part the product of four 
foresight workshops. For the purpose of this book-
let, we have simplified them by focusing on just two 
of their variables (the originals were built on five or 
six). We then worked them into cohesive two-step 
narratives together with our in-house experts be-
fore picturing how the European Union will fare in 
each – and what kind of attributes the EU needs to 
build up if it is to sustain its capacity to act.13
“CAPACITY TO ACT”: SIGNPOSTS FOR HOW 
WELL THE EU WILL NAVIGATE FUTURE CRISES
What do we mean by Europe’s “capacity to act”? The 
EU is a market power – a regulatory power – and its 
capacity to act at home and abroad is primarily re-
lated to its economic and standard-setting prow-
ess. Consequently, we carried out the foresight ex-
ercise to generate signposts for us to analyze how 
well EU policymaking performs under strain and as-
sess whether European regulators are ready for the 
future. Are Europe’s rule-makers on a good path in 
these four fields, and are they capable of changing di-
rection where necessary and nimbly making new in-
vestments and setting new standards? We will chart 
the EU’s real-world progress in follow-up monitoring 
studies – one for each of the four fields – but this 
scenario booklet is meant to stand on its own. It of-
fers readers – and voters – a way to judge the strate-
gic approach of EU policy for themselves. 
Each of the four main chapters imagines how the 
world might look in 2030. Each one imagines three 
different futures in the respective field of tech, se-
1 The authors thank those who have given their expertise and acknowledge that any errors are ours alone.
curity, geo-economics, and migration, as well as 
the paths that the EU might take to navigate them: 
a status quo scenario, best-case scenario, and 
worst-case scenario. Each time, the “status quo 
scenario” represents the European Union’s current 
path as we understand it and examines the impli-
cations of this current path for future resilience. 
The two alternate scenarios are judged “best” or 
“worst” not by the gravity of the disasters or ros-
iness of the opportunities Europeans face along 
the way, but by the outcome for the EU. Togeth-
er, they tell us something about which character-
istics the EU must develop to not only act in a cri-
sis but also harness it. We draw lessons for policy 
after each scenario.
LINEAR THINKING: HOW BRUSSELS STANDS  
IN ITS OWN WAY WHEN IT COMES TO NIMBLE 
POLICYMAKING
The exercise confirmed the importance of nimble 
policymaking and regulation by the EU if it is to 
withstand and harness disruptive crises. In those 
scenarios where the EU achieved this – the best-
case scenarios – then because it had invested in 
such basics as European cohesion and internation-
al relationship-building. This allowed it to change 
course and adapt. Investments in Europe’s internal 
cohesion gave it the sufficient political flexibility to 
make new rules when the situation changed. In the 
tech chapter, for example, an early pension fund 
reform allowed companies to invest in overcoming 
Europe’s digital divide, a move that paid dividends 
when crisis hit. International relationship-building 
allowed the EU to export its models during a glob-
al crisis or respond well to foreign initiatives. In the 
best-case geo-economics scenario, for instance, 
the EU had made open-ended investments in the 
resilience and connectivity of South Asian states, 
meaning that these countries did not behave de-
fensively when catastrophe came. 
The status quo and worst-case scenarios show, by 
contrast, just how often the EU stands in its own 
way and prevents itself from a nimble response. 
In the face of disruption, the EU sticks to old lin-
ear assumptions and projections. We were able 
to show this because each of the four main chap-
ters in this booklet are built around two variables 
that are usually held in a simple cause-effect rela-
tionship by Brussels policymakers. Yet we generat-
ed three fundamentally different combinations of 
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tled relationships and challenge consensus posi-
tions. The best-case scenarios all occurred when 
policymakers flipped old assumptions on their head 
and changed paths. But in the status quo outcomes 
the EU ignored the change and stuck with existing 
assumptions; and in the worst-case scenarios it ac-
tively reinforced its old path by backing it up with 
geopolitical muscle. The first basic lesson is that 
the EU must look upon disruptions as a means to 
change policy course.
THE PURSUIT OF EUROPEAN AUTONOMY: A COM-
MON THEME IN THE WORST-CASE SCENARIOS
The second basic lesson is that the EU should use 
disruptions to break policy silos. The EU does in-
deed aspire to respond to crisis in this iconoclas-
tic style. The European Commission’s 2020 report 
Charting the Course Towards a More Resilient Eu-
rope is an upbeat manifesto for bouncing back from 
crisis better – for breaking silos, combining com-
petencies and powers in new ways, and coming 
back more democratically, equitably, and sustain-
ably. But the EU’s aspirations do not seem to match 
the current realities of EU policy decisions. With its 
mantra to “never waste a crisis,” the EU usually uses 
disruption to deepen an existing project rather than 
rethink or even dismantle it. This typically involves 
“completing” existing integration endeavors such 
as the digital single market, eurozone, or Schen-
gen. The four status quo scenarios by definition in-
volved this kind of continuity; it is notable that, in 
all four, things ended negatively for the EU.
THE SCENARIOS CHALLENGE TODAY’S  
ASSUMPTIONS AND ILLUSTRATE THAT:
• It is possible for the EU to maintain and spread its 
democratic values without first resorting to heavy 
market regulation in the tech domain;
• It is possible for the EU to be a leader in resolv-
ing the new drivers of conflict like climate change 
without resorting primarily to ambitious unilateral 
commitments;
• It is possible for the EU to secure access to new 
resources and technologies without focusing pri-
marily on keeping up with the United States and 
China; and
• It is possible for the EU to attract the kinds of 
inter national labor it desires without attracting 
disproportionate levels of irregular migration 
from Africa. 
2  The idea that the EU can exercise regulatory power was first set out by academics like Anu Bradford and subsequently picked up and adapted by 
politicians like Charles Michel, the president of the European Council. See: Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World 
(Oxford, 2020). 
As such, the scenarios offer a corrective to the fash-
ionable idea of achieving autonomy and, in partic-
ular, the EU’s embrace of the “Brussels Effect.” The 
Brussels Effect is the EU’s ambition to live by its 
own rules in a hostile international environment – 
to unilaterally regulate globalization.24In the cur-
rent defensive version that characterizes the status 
quo scenarios, it involves the EU “completing” inte-
gration projects, closing off its various internal mar-
kets and deepening the relevant internal rules. The 
EU puts up protections not just because it needs 
to but because it believes this gives it leverage in 
a disruptive world. It tries to leverage access to Eu-
rope’s consumers and oblige foreign countries and 
businesses to take on its regulations. In our scenar-
ios, when the EU behaved in this way, it only cut Eu-
rope’s internal market off from global supplies of 
natural and human resources and stymied Europe-
an innovation under red tape. It also politicized pro-
tective EU measures such as investment screening 
or visa controls, which are necessary on their own 
merits. In short, it made the EU vulnerable to crisis.
THE INSTRUMENTAL USE OF STRATEGIC  
FORE SIGHT: WHY THE EU ASKS THE WRONG 
QUESTIONS
The third lesson derives from the notable fact that 
the best-case scenarios in all four chapters began 
with a major crisis or even catastrophe, but the 
worst-case scenarios did not. This was counterintu-
itive: catastrophes are surely something for worst-
case worlds. And yet, it was the outcomes we were 
judging. And the ability to absorb catastrophe and 
harness it in the best cases derived from the fact 
that the EU had avoided relying too heavily on threat 
analyses and strong projections. This left it unpre-
pared for the particular crisis that hit – but adapt-
able. In the worst-case scenarios, by contrast, we 
imagined the EU successfully predicted the next big 
crisis and protected itself against it. But its response 
lacked flexibility and improvisation. Moreover, it had 
also “predicted” vast other crises and invested in pro-
tective defenses to these as well, leaving its resourc-
es exhausted. It tended to push ahead with its chosen 
course in the face of resistance at home and abroad 
using heavy-handed power-political tools.
This provided us with lessons about how to use 
strategic foresight in the real world. The status quo 
scenarios illustrated that the EU is relying too much 
on horizon-scanning and trend analysis and too lit-
















Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030
5No. 13 | July 2021
REPORT
ing to use threat analyses and linear projections to 
anticipate unpredictable future disruptions. There is 
even a danger that the EU will start instrumentaliz-
ing foresight in order to justify a pre-cooked policy 
course such as “autonomy.” Already there are signs 
that the EU is using threat analyses to show how 
globalization is going wrong and justify closing off 
EU markets – generating unilateral European rules 
on artificial intelligence, climate change, and mi-
gration and trying to impose them on others. The 
worst-case scenarios show that such policies are 
liable to backfire and create precisely the hostile 
geopolitical situations they were meant to prevent. 
This booklet documents our aim to deploy foresight 
in more speculative and open-ended ways.
BREAKING BOTH SILOS AND POLICY PATHS: 
TOWARD A DIFFERENT KIND OF EUROPEAN 
MARKET POWER
In sum, the scenarios suggest that a resilient EU is 
one that avoids thinking in silos and trajectories 
and makes careful but open-ended commitments 
to integration across borders and fields. It is nota-
ble, for instance, just how much the strategic chal-
lenges of tech, geo-economics, climate, and migra-
tion cut across all the chapters and not only those 
dedicated to each one. The masterful EU of the 
best-case scenarios is one that breaks silos and 
combines its digital, capital, defense, and labor 
markets in pursuit of growth, innovation, and dem-
ocratic values. Whereas the pursuit of the Brussels 
Effect tends to envision the EU using each crisis to 
ratchet an individual market project to completion 
– the digital single market, the defense market, 
and so on – the more successful approach would 
see the EU mixing and matching across its market 
competencies to maintain access to innovations, 
capital, state backing, and the brightest minds.
That is the recipe for a more compelling form of 
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The Story  
Lines in Our 
Four Fields
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES  
STORY LINE
For the purposes of this booklet, we took two variables from 
this scenario – the EU’s regulatory power and the use of new 
technologies for power political competition – and ran them 
through different iterations. The overall finding is that the 
EU is too quick to regulate in its bid to protect its demo-
cratic values. Only in the best-case scenario does it learn 
that assertive regulation comes at the cost of innovation, 
and innovation is what it needs to build the European mar-
ket, encourage Europeans to be early adopters, and develop 
technologies that are snapped up abroad – in short, to use 
disruptive new technologies to sustain and spread its values.
 - In the status quo scenario, the EU initially does well in 
regulating for data protection and the use of artificial intel-
ligence. Its standards are taken up worldwide as large mul-
tinational tech firms seek the kind of regulatory size and 
stability that the EU offers. But policymakers in Brussels 
get carried away by this early success, and rifts appear with 
the United States about which of them is the global stan-
dard-bearer for democratic values. By 2030, Europe’s tech 
economy and level of innovation fade, and the EU finds itself 
on the sidelines. It is forced to watch as the United States 
and China regulate things together. 
 - In the worst-case scenario, the EU focuses on regulating 
communication technologies, which are vital for democra-
cy and the European public sphere. It, thus, seeks to protect 
itself from hostile disinformation campaigns and, in turn, 
sustain and spread its values. But for ideological reasons it 
invests in a huge satellite internet project to create infor-
mation autonomy. This investment diverts state support 
away from smaller firms and bottom-up innovation. As the 
European economy sinks and loses its value as an integrat-
ed regulatory space, the Chinese do launch a massive disin-
formation campaign.
 - In the best-case scenario, the EU invests in projects that 
are either in tune with Europeans’ priorities or capture 
their imagination – for example, it supports quantum tech-
nology, the digital euro, and a Mars exploration program. 
Consequently, these initiatives help smaller European firms 
to innovate, and they build Europeans’ trust in technolo-
gy, even as natural disasters lead to global tech outages. The 
EU market grows as European technology is adopted first 
at home and then abroad. Having thus addressed the digital 
divide inside Europe, the EU is able to engage in nimble and 
sympathetic norm-setting. 
This report was written in the framework of DGAP’s 
“Ideenwerkstatt Deutsche Außenpolitik,” a project 
funded by Stiftung Mercator that reflects on the ca-
pacity to act in German and European foreign policy. 
To assess whether the EU is on the right course for 
2030, we looked at four fields: technology, geo-eco-
nomics, security, and migration. By envisioning three 
scenarios for 2030 in each one – a status quo, worst-
case, and best-case scenario – we aim to ensure the 
EU is properly aware of the implications of continuing 
its current trajectory, is prepared for the worst, and 
understands how to achieve the best. While our group 
of experts has created scenarios based on multiple 
dynamics for us to use as a benchmark to monitor the 
EU’s progress over the next decade, we have cher-
ry-picked a single one for this booklet and pulled out 
two of its key variables. The status quo, worst-case, 
and best-case scenarios outlined here each combine 
these variables in different ways and challenge the 
usually assumed cause-effect relationship between 
them, thereby highlighting new policy options that 
break old path dependencies in Brussels and Berlin.
Taken together, we note that the status quo and 
worst-case scenarios are not so different in all four 
chapters. Both tend to envision the EU trying to 
leverage its internal market in a bid to unilaterally in-
fluence and regulate globalization. If the worst-case 
scenarios are worse, then because, in them, the EU 
tends to behave in a more assertive ideological man-
ner and be more mistrustful of outside powers. In the 
best-case scenarios, ironically, it is often a major crisis 
or disaster that catalyzes a positive change of path. It 
is notable that, whereas in the status quo and worst 
cases the EU has tried to predict crises and protect 
itself against them, in the best cases it has tended to 
invest in relations and generic capabilities that help 
it respond to whatever comes. Successful resilience 
is – in large part – about attitude.
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TRADE AND GEO-ECONOMICS  
STORY LINE
The two variables we selected here were the quality of re-
lations between the United States and China and the EU’s 
access to resources and technology. The overall finding is 
that the EU should not focus primarily on competing with 
the United States and China – or even trying to force them 
to cooperate. Both US-Chinese cooperation and com-
petition lead to the EU being cut out of the global mar-
ket, restricting its access to resources and technological 
breakthroughs. The priority should rather be to create is-
sue-specific alliances that diffuse influence and power 
away from the “G2.” 
 - In the status quo scenario, competition between the 
United States and China grows, and multilateral organi-
zations like the WTO cease to work properly. Beijing and 
Washington drive up global innovation and resource ac-
cess, but they do so by creating two competing blocs that 
decouple and seek to close the other out. The EU tries to 
keep up but almost inevitably fails to compete with Chi-
na and the United States. The EU is divided between the 
two of them – while Brussels tries to align with the Unit-
ed States on regulatory terms, poorer member states align 
with China for cost reasons.
 - In the worst-case scenario, China and the United States 
cooperate and begin to bilaterally establish rules on access 
to resources and technologies. Cooperation occurs because 
China has turned into the predominant economic super-
power and the United States has retreated. China is partic-
ularly active in imposing “cooperation agreements” on other 
countries, having sponsored their regional bodies. The EU, 
as a result, finds itself in a cooperative international order 
structured around the United States and China but finds its 
access to disruptive new technologies strictly limited by a 
Beijing that fears triggering instability.
 - In the best-case scenario, the EU does not focus on com-
peting or cooperating with the United States and China. In-
stead, it finds itself caught up with India, which has been hit 
by disaster and finds itself committing to multilateral orga-
nizations like the World Trade Organization whose reform 
it has long blocked. The EU sees a way to reinvigorate its 
own international reform agenda. It helps set up issue-spe-
cific international networks of governments, businesses, 
experts, and citizens around resources and technologies – 
platforms in which smaller states, including its own mem-
bers, have some influence. 
EMERGING SECURITY THREATS  
STORY LINE
The two variables we took in this field were climate change 
and the quality of security cooperation. The finding here is 
that investing in security cooperation is one key to success-
ful global climate adaptation, allowing for the exchange of 
technologies as well as permitting cooperation in domains 
like space. The EU’s assumption was the reverse: that the 
progressive breakdown in international security cooper-
ation is a result of climate stress, the logical response to 
which is to strengthen its unilateral commitment to climate 
targets. In fact, this unilateral attempt to regulate global cli-
mate targets and deal with conflict drivers is self-defeating.
 - In the status quo scenario, global security cooperation be-
comes sclerotic due to a lack of investment from the United 
States and its allies. Consequently, the incidence of conflict 
rises. In this difficult landscape, the EU invests in high uni-
lateral climate commitments. This does indeed protect it 
from violence, but only because the main form of violence is 
an eco-extremism spurred by hostility at the lack of inter-
national ambition and cooperation. Although the EU is ini-
tially spared this thanks to its high unilateral standards, the 
lack of security cooperation allows this violence to spill in-
to Europe.
 - In the worst-case scenario, global security cooperation 
breaks down and is replaced worldwide by the emergence 
of regional security orders. The EU embraces this shift, po-
sitioning itself as a leader in regional governance. It offers 
its neighbors generous access to its Green Deal for taking on 
its standards. But the breakdown of global security cooper-
ation leads to highly risky regional behavior, not least when 
it comes to climate engineering. As the EU tries to keep its 
regional order together, it lifts conditionality to access its 
green funds, leading to corruption and leaving Eastern Eu-
rope open to conflict.
 - In the best-case scenario, global security cooperation 
all but collapses – leaving states badly exposed when a se-
ries of climate catastrophes roll across the Pacific, hit-
ting both China and the United States. The pair reinvest 
in trust-building, which permits climate-related cooper-
ation across all domains: space, maritime, land, airspace, 
and cyber. This cautious rapprochement between the Unit-
ed States and China unlocks cooperation between Western 
countries and emerging powers. The EU is able to take 
advantage of these shifts because it has been investing 
in security cooperation itself.
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MIGRATION STORY LINE
The two variables we took here were the EU’s policies to 
compete for global migrants and the volume of irregular 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Our finding is that 
the EU’s fears are self-fulfilling. It believes that every time 
it opens up and competes with the world’s other large la-
bor markets for migrants, it will attract a disproportionate 
influx of irregular migration from Africa. Gradually, the EU 
learns that Africa itself is capable of producing competitive 
labor markets that retain labor. It is European policies to buf-
fer against irregular migration from Africa that disrupt these 
markets and give rise to large volumes of irregular migration.
 - In the status quo scenario, the EU must make its labor 
market attractive for transactional gain. China has started 
making deals with elites worldwide, offering access to Chi-
nese universities and jobs in return for access to natural re-
sources. Forced into competing, the EU is obliged to reduce 
any political conditionality it might have imposed on its Af-
rican partners – after all, China does not impose political 
conditions there. The human rights and democratic situa-
tion in Africa subsequently deteriorates. The EU’s efforts to 
make its labor market more attractive than China’s while 
closing itself off to its near abroad lead to a huge wave of 
migrants from East and West Africa.
 - In the worst-case scenario, the EU finds itself again com-
peting with Asian labor markets – this time because mi-
gration and regional free movement have become tools of 
geopolitical alliance building and geo-economic competition. 
The EU positions itself as a civilizational zone and conse-
quently hardens its border to North Africa. But North African 
states like Morocco exploit the way Europe is closing itself off 
and reach out to their own southern neighbors, using migra-
tion diplomacy to tip the balance of power in West and East 
Africa. Soon, Morocco is overwhelmed by the strains of han-
dling migration in this way. Another wave of migration from 
sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa to Europe results.
 - In the best-case scenario, China’s population ages and 
shrinks, and its economy dips, leading it to withdraw invest-
ment and “security advisors” from spots like East Africa. As 
conflict in Africa grows, the EU fears its own relative attrac-
tiveness and starts offering African elites access to the Euro-
pean labor market in return for holding back migrants. But 
the Ethiopian government explains that Europe is not, in fact, 
an attractive destination. Instead, Addis Ababa would prefer 
to receive support to build up the East African labor market. 
Having proved it can retain local labor, it asks for further 
support from the EU to pressure other regional labor markets 
like the Gulf, demanding they treat migrant workers better. 
As a result, Europe becomes competitive but faces no influx.
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COVID-19 is yet another development that demonstrates 
the EU’s weak ability to withstand crisis. The pandemic re-
vealed Europe’s heavy reliance on a global governance sys-
tem that is no longer fit for purpose; it showed the limits of 
the EU’s economic power, exposing weak links and critical 
dependencies in supply chains; and it made clear that disin-
formation is impacting its political decision-making. It also 
illustrated the EU’s inability to harness and use disruptions. 
While the pandemic has catalyzed a whole set of unexpect-
ed outcomes – events that are high impact, highly improba-
ble, and explicable only in retrospect – the EU has remained 
stuck in a familiar path and set of long-term goals, trapped 
in thinking that is linear and siloed. Really, it ought to be 
better at this by now. But when a system of governance that 
was considered futuristic as recently as the 1990s is forced 
into reactive mode, it looks vulnerable and unwieldy.
The pandemic had not been properly anticipated in Europe: 
warned of – yes, many times – but not actively prepared for. 
Although some contingency planning existed for the risk of 
such a health crisis – the German White Book on Security 
Policy considered pandemics one of ten key challenges to 
German security – little action had been taken. The UK is 
usually singled out for missing an open goal here. Despite 
its Operation Cygnus, a 2016 exercise on a “Swan Flu” pan-
demic, it failed to apply the 20 lessons that resulted. Inter-
ested Asian states, by contrast, noted the exercise and did. 
Singapore, for example, duly rode out the COVID-19 pan-
demic thanks, in part, to the insights it had borrowed from 
Cygnus. But Singapore had also had recent experience with 
avian flu and was looking to hone its system while the UK 
faced multiple possible threats all vying for attention and 
invested a little in each.
Such episodes thus raise three important questions, 
which we address here:
1. How can such overwhelming crises be anticipated?
2.  How can resilience toward this type of crisis be enhanced?
3.  What is the right relationship between anticipation  
and resilience? 
These questions are relevant because we can quite easily 
predict the big drivers of global change: breakthroughs in 
digital technologies, economic shifts, climate change, and 
demographic trends. And governments can, in turn, put 
strategic planning measures, such as top-down government 
initiatives and targets, in place. But, as we have seen, the 
effects of these global changes are often highly unpredict-
able. It is bottom-up resilience that is often most useful in 
such situations – with past open-ended investments in so-
cietal cohesion and international partnership paying off. In 
our assessment, it was the failure to build up domestic co-
hesion and international relationships and not the failure to 
implement the results of the Cygnus exercise that was re-
ally missing in Boris Johnson’s UK. Consequently, Britain’s 
loss of bounce provides the real lesson that Europeans must 
learn for the future.
FROM COVID-19 TO 2030:  
EUROPE’S PATH TO THE FUTURE
Last year, many organizations looked resolutely for-
ward, predicting the big challenges of the future and set-
ting themselves new targets and strategies. The year 2030 
served as a target date for processes such as the UN’s Agen-
da 2030 and NATO’s Reflection Process. NATO, for exam-
ple, expressed the will to strengthen its political profile and 
adapt to the new geopolitical environment by 2030. As NA-
TO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it: “As the world 
changes, NATO will continue to change.” That strategists in 
their corner offices in HQs would use the date 2020 as an 
excuse and spur to look forward a decade to 2030 was per-
haps the only really predictable thing about the last year. 
The COVID-19 crisis – a full-on crisis of post-1990s glo-
balization – only reinforced the sense that 2020 was a year 
that would define our future course, forcing us to take a 
step back and think about how our future can play out. 
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen like-
wise placed a new focus on strategic foresight by putting 
one of her vice presidents in charge of mainstreaming it 
across the Commission’s services. But these EU exercises 
either repeated common assumptions or struggled to chal-
lenge them. The trouble was that the exercises could not 
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counteract the implicit understanding that certain domes-
tic and international structures and drivers are given. This 
is a common feature of risk analysis and capability planning 
– to take risk factors as immovable constants, feeding into a 
bleak, negative, and ultimately defensive vision of the future 
that is all too common among policymakers in Europe. Such 
views tend to project an EU increasingly alone within a hos-
tile global environment – an EU that must come together by 
existential necessity rather than free choice.
This tendency for linear thinking is particularly prevalent in 
Germany, a country known for its status quo approach to 
global affairs. In the very near future, of course, the German 
status quo will be disrupted. Not only is Chancellor Angela 
Merkel set to step down in September 2021 after 16 years 
in office, but recent polling suggests that the long-ruling 
“grand coalition” of Christian Democrats and Social Dem-
ocrats is also set to disappear. This sweeping change at the 
heart of Europe, coming just ahead of a 2022 French pres-
idential election, can be a unique opportunity to set the 
EU on a new path. And yet, in Berlin, Paris, and Commis-
sion HQ, policymakers seem to be most focused on mak-
ing progress for the EU in the preexisting Franco-German 
agendas – deepening the euro area and Schengen as well 
as, thanks to current US attention, trade and, above all, the 
digital market. 
Insofar as a strategic agenda has emerged in Berlin and Paris, 
then around the ideas of “European autonomy” and a “geopo-
litical EU.” Such an agenda melds the French desire for the EU 
to carve an autonomous path in the world and put up protec-
tive barriers around itself with a German commitment to the 
international rules-based order and deepening EU integration. 
Its current iteration involves the EU closing off old market in-
tegration projects from the outside world and deepening their 
regulation to then use market access and other geopolitical le-
vers to spread these regulations to other countries. This agen-
da claims to reverse the errors the EU made in the 1990s when 
Europe supposedly embraced the “end of history” and global 
market integration. But it employs precisely the kind of deter-
ministic linear thinking that it purports to be correcting – this 
time, as “the return of history” and “globalization gone wrong” 
– to persuade Europeans that they must close themselves off 
and press through their priorities autonomously. 
3 N.N., “Tech regulation: The Brussels effect, continued,” The Economist, February 20, 2020.
4  Felix Richter, “Amazon Leads $130-Billion Cloud Market,” Statista, February 4, 2021: 
https://www.statista.com/chart/18819/worldwide-market-share-of-leading-cloud-infrastructure-service-provider (accessed March 1, 2021).
5  European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sectors in the EU – A Foresight Study,” September 3, 2020:  
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/42881 (accessed March 1, 2021).
6  International Committee of the Red Cross, “When Rain Turns to Dust,” ICRC Report, July 7, 2020:  
https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/rain_turns_to_dust_climate_change_conflict.pdf (accessed March 1, 2021). 
7  Adrien Detges, “Climate and Conflict: Reviewing the Statistical Evidence,” Report of the Climate Diplomacy Initiative (a collaborative effort of Germany’s 
Federal Foreign Office in partnership with adelphi), March 2017: https://www.adelphi.de/de/system/files/mediathek/bilder/CD%20Report_Quant_201705%20
Detges%20adelphi%20Climate%20and%20Conflict.pdf (accessed March 1, 2021).
THE EU’S CURRENT NEGATIVE 
TRAJECTORY
It has to be acknowledged that, looking purely at projec-
tions and trajectories, things do indeed look bad for the EU, 
especially when one thinks back to the hopeful years of the 
1990s. Back then, a “free and whole” and “postmodern” Eu-
rope served as a model for the future. Today, its trajecto-
ry in four key fields looks bleaker, and its futures exercises 
tend to inform big top-down course corrections or efforts 
to protect the EU from a hostile world: 
The tech trajectory: European companies currently 
make up less than 4 percent of market capitalization in 
the world’s 70 largest digital companies – with compa-
nies from the United States and China representing 73 
percent and 18 percent, respectively.3 In other areas, EU 
providers are barely even present. For example, none of 
the 8 largest cloud service providers are European while 
71 percent are from the US.4 Lacking a start-up culture 
and ready well of capital and squeezed between the Unit-
ed States and China, the EU’s tech market seems destined 
to dwindle.
The geo-economics trajectory: The EU’s dependence on 
others for critical resources is growing – for example, when 
it comes to importing critical resources from non-EU coun-
tries. Europe currently imports 78 percent of its lithium 
from Chile and almost 100 percent of rare earths from Chi-
na. Given trends in sectors such as engineering and digital 
technology, the EU will need even more. According to a Eu-
ropean Commission forecast, the EU would need 18 times the 
amount of lithium it currently disposes of by 2030 if demand 
keeps soaring.5 
The security trajectory: Sixty percent of the countries 
most vulnerable to climate change are already affected by 
armed conflict.6 And a changing climate exponentially ex-
acerbates conflict.7 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross foresees that 200 million people will be in need of hu-
manitarian assistance in 2050, partly due to ecological ef-
fects. For example, the impact of climate change will be felt 
in a decline in human security in the EU’s neighborhood. 
Europe itself will see more frequent and intense natural 
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hazards – for example, with extreme heat waves to occur 
once in two years from 2050 onward.8
The migration trajectory: The “laws” of demography and 
market “push and pull” look bleak. One hundred years ago, 
when Europe still enjoyed a degree of global ascendancy, its 
demography accounted for 20 percent of the world’s popu-
lation.9 By 2030, it will be around 8.5 percent.10 But, judged 
in raw numbers, Europe is the most attractive destination 
for global migrants, drawing in nearly one third of them, 
particularly those from nearby unstable countries.11 The EU 
looks set to experience an increase of between 21 and 44 
percent in immigration compared to the previous decade, 
much of it irregular.12 
WAYS IN WHICH BIG DISRUPTIONS 
ALLOW US TO CHANGE TRAJECTORIES
In short, by most measures, conflict is set to increase, cli-
mate impacts to become heavier, innovation in Europe to 
shrink, and demographic changes to create vital skills gaps 
that will not be filled despite large-scale migration. But fore-
sight is an opportunity to think beyond present structures 
and recognize that charting a trajectory from past to pres-
ent does not always help us understand what is next, let 
alone inspire Europeans to build up a capacity to seize op-
portunities that may emerge en route to 2030. For this, the 
EU needs to overcome its negativity biases – for example, a 
perception of being a fortress under siege by migrants or of 
being stuck between the United States and China. Other-
wise, its path will be one of fatalism and self-fulfilling fears. 
Instead of, as today, charting trajectories and trying to pre-
dict the next big disruptive crisis, it is a useful mental ex-
ercise to accept that big disruptions will come and, so, to 
ask what alternative new paths these might open up for the 
EU. To this end, it is instructive to show how the COVID-19 
8  European Environment Agency, “Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Europe,” EEA Report No. 15 (2017):  
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-adaptation-and-disaster (accessed March 1, 2021).
9 Bella Jordan et al., The European Culture Area: A Systematic Geography (London, 2020), p.74.
10  UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, UN Population 2030 (2015):  
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/trends/Population2030.pdf (accessed March 1, 2021.)
11 IOM, Migration in the World: https://www.iom.sk/en/migration/migration-in-the-world.html (accessed March 1, 2021).
12  IOM, “Assessing immigration scenarios for the European Union in 2030,” GMDAC Report, September 23, 2020:  
https://publications.iom.int/books/assessing-immigration-scenarios-european-union-2030 (accessed March 1, 2021).
13  UNCTAD, “How COVID-19 triggered the digital and e-commerce turning point,” UNCTAD Blog, March 15, 2021:  
https://unctad.org/news/how-covid-19-triggered-digital-and-e-commerce-turning-point (accessed June 1, 2021).
14  Stephanie Kanowitz, “Tech called up ‘in the war against the unexpected,’” Government Computer News, March 19, 2020: 
https://gcn.com/articles/2020/03/19/downstream-tech-effects-pandemic.aspx (accessed June 1, 2021).
15  Melissa S. Kearney and Phillip Levine, “The Coming COVID-19 Baby Bust Is Here,” Brookings Blog, May 5, 2021:  
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/05/the-coming-covid-19-baby-bust-is-her (accessed June 1, 2021).
16  Julie Boillat and Julie Zaehringer, “COVID-19, reverse migration, and the impact on land systems,” Global Land Programme Blog, September 16, 2020:  
https://glp.earth/news-events/blog/covid-19-reverse-migration-and-impact-land-systems (accessed March 1, 2021).
17  Melissa Pavlik, “A Great And Sudden Change: The Global Political Violence Landscape Before And After The COVID-19 Pandemic,” ACLED Special Report: https://acleddata.
com/2020/08/04/a-great-and-sudden-change-the-global-political-violence-landscape-before-and-after-the-covid-19-pandemic (accessed June 1, 2021).
pandemic is already altering trajectories in key fields by 
exacerbating the following:
Acceleration and deceleration: The digitization of supply 
chains and customer interaction leapt forward by an es-
timated four years and the creation of digital products by 
seven years. E-commerce’s share of global retail trade grew 
from 14 percent in 2019 to about 17 percent in 2020. The 
adoption of cryptocurrencies and moves toward a cashless 
society accelerated.13 Blockchain applications were used to 
track contagion, manage a tsunami of health insurance pay-
ments, and uphold medical supply chains. But other trends 
were sent into reverse, including biometric solutions such 
as fingerprint recognition, which rely on physical contact 
that now poses a health risk, and facial recognition, which 
became difficult in mask-wearing populations.14
Unexpected new eventualities: The pandemic braked years 
of global demographic growth. The deadly virus exercised 
a downward effect although not through the predicted 
mechanism of increased deaths. Rather, the long-term de-
mographic trajectory was depressed due to reduced births 
as families delayed having children or even dropped the 
idea altogether.15 Large cities and developed economies al-
so experienced population loss through “reverse migration,” 
the return of migrant workers to their countries and rural 
areas of origin.16 And there was a growth in regional travel 
bubbles as neighboring countries focused away from glob-
al labor and concentrated on keeping their borders open to 
one another. 
Lingering uncertainties: As for drivers of conflict like cli-
mate change, it is unclear whether the reduced emissions 
from physical travel or the growth of emissions from ener-
gy-hungry technologies like blockchain and cryptocurrency 
will win out. While political violence dipped by 10 percent 
month on month, and demonstrations significantly declined 
by roughly 30 percent,17 the increased use of online plat-
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forms seemed to herald a lurch toward authoritarianism 
and surveillance.18 But it is also worth underlining that these 
uncertainties remain largely because Europeans failed to 
seize the moment to ensure positive change – despite be-
ing first-movers on breakthroughs such as establishing re-
gional travel bubbles.19
OUR OWN FORESIGHT EXERCISE
We at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 
were not immune from the trend of looking at the future. 
In autumn 2020, we convened experts and officials for four 
three-day workshops to think of the global landscape in 
2030, each of the four focusing on a different field of dis-
ruption with vast transformative potential: digital technol-
ogies, trade and geo-economics, emerging security threats, 
and large-scale migration. In each of these policy fields, we 
asked the group of experts to construct different versions 
of the future, drawing not on predictions and probabilities, 
but rather on eventualities that are plausible. We told them 
we wanted to know what the European future might look 
like if the EU responded to disruptions in a similar way as 
today, the status quo scenario; how it could avoid a worst-
case scenario; and how it could move toward a best-case 
scenario. In other words, how to use these disruptive fields 
to change paths in positive ways. 
As such, our scenarios were not built from projections, 
charting a line from (say) the 1990s through 2020 into 
the 2030s. For each of the four fields, our experts instead 
picked out a small selection of factors to provide scaffold-
ing for global order in 2030: these variables had to rank as 
uncertain but influential – “high impact and high uncer-
tainty” – when it came to determining the future within the 
respective policy fields. We then asked the groups to com-
bine these variables in different ways, using the interplay to 
shape diverse future environments. The worlds we imag-
ined were very different to today’s trajectory, but we were 
able to explain how we got there in retrospect, working our 
way backward from 2030 to 2020. Finally, having created 
multiple alternative futures, we asked the experts to “road 
test” the EU’s behavior under different conditions condu-
cive to a status quo, worst, or best outcome. 
In the field of security and defense, for instance, variables 
included big unknowns such as the future quality of mul-
18  N.N., “Experts Say the ‘New Normal’ in 2025 Will Be Far More Tech-Driven, Presenting More Big Challenges,” Pew Research Center, February 18, 2021:  
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/02/18/experts-say-the-new-normal-in-2025-will-be-far-more-tech-driven-presenting-more-big-challenges  
(accessed June 1, 2021).
19  Meghan Benton, “What’s Next for Global Migration? Gazing Into the COVID-19 Crystal Ball,” MPI podcast, December 9, 2020:  
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/multimedia/moving-beyond-pandemic-global-migration-covid-crystal-ball (accessed March 1, 2021).
tilateralism and the commitment to – or increasing irrel-
evance of – multilateral institutions. In tech, key factors 
included the capacity for climate governance or innovation 
and the level of advance or stagnation in tech companies. 
Several factors were considered as near “certainties” across 
scenarios. In almost every one, China became more power-
ful and influential than in 2020, there was more great power 
competition, and irregular and mass migration was consid-
ered a challenge or a threat by policymakers and the pub-
lic alike. But, for instance, in spite of increasing geopolitical 
and US-China competition, no scenario foresaw that the US 
dollar would be fully eclipsed as a lead currency by 2030.
FIVE KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR THE EU’S 
CAPACITY TO ACT IN 2030 
We wanted all our futures to be plausible. But that does 
not mean that they are probable. Rather, we asked wheth-
er the combination of variables we chose and the path we 
subsequently plotted backward from 2030 to 2020 were 
credible. For this reason, readers should treat the vari-
ous scenarios as creative thought exercises to identify 
opportunities and pitfalls but not take them at face val-
ue. Moreover, they are narrative scenarios, meaning, in 
some instances, that our experts or we ourselves added 
color to future events that we deemed relatively unlike-
ly but which had a strong narrative effect. In order to un-
derline certain conclusions and messages, for example, 
we envisioned that the European Commission would drive 
through the domestic use of “satellite internet” or that ex-
cessive climate geo-engineering by US companies would 
cause death zones in the Mediterranean. 
Caveats aside, what can we learn from this exercise? Across 
the four fields, five findings emerged that are instructive: 
First, perhaps unsurprisingly, all four of our individu-
al policy fields are interconnected. Hardly any of the core 
variables that caused the most important effects can be al-
located to either one or the other disruptive field (tech, cli-
mate, etc.). Even if the different policy fields are looked at 
in isolation, they interact. For example, the challenge of cli-
mate change and related mitigation (through multilater-
al action commitment) and adaptation (through innovative 
green technology) has an impact on the frequency and type 
of possible conflict, future migration and regional coopera-
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tion patterns, trade, and competition on innovation in tech. 
And states’ capacity to harness changes in each individu-
al field relied on their access to dip into other fields, i.e., 
to access new technologies, capital, natural resources, and 
sharp minds.
Second, and similar to this, all twelve scenarios were ulti-
mately determined by a limited number of variables that 
often overlapped. One of the variables that had a deci-
sive impact across all scenarios is the quality of great pow-
er competition – not so much the degree of competition, 
confrontation, or cooperation between the United States 
and China, but rather the state of multilateralism and the 
appetite for international cooperation. This frequent-
ly defined whether scenarios turned out to be positive or 
negative – e.g., whether the EU’s neighbors felt like coop-
erating with the EU in terms of migration, whether global 
powers jointly worked on tech innovation and regulation or 
weaponized technologies, and whether they cooperated on 
solutions to mitigate climate change or escalated negative 
effects by either doing nothing or pursuing unilateral adap-
tation. To harness a crisis successfully, it helped if the EU 
had invested in strong international relations.
Third, no matter how these variables play out and how-
ever they are intertwined, their ultimate effect on Europe 
depended on domestic factors – the state of EU internal af-
fairs, the level of trust of EU citizens, socioeconomic cohe-
sion, and political unity – in short, on internal resilience. 
When working our way backward from 2030 to the present 
day, we found that, if there was a divide on a relevant issue 
within Europe to start with, it became harder for the EU to 
act in a crisis and easier for external actors to squeeze in 
and create a permanent gap. If domestic cohesion is high, 
by contrast, positive developments can be amplified, nega-
tive effects can be toned town, and (the old cliché, but nev-
er truer than in the disruptive decades of the 2020s) crises 
can even be turned into opportunity.
Fourth – illustrative of an urgent need for the EU to seize on 
opportunities for policy change – we observed that the sta-
tus quo and worst-case scenarios were surprisingly sim-
ilar. In the field of security, the status quo scenario sees 
paralyzed international security institutions: a NATO with-
out the United States, an inactive United Nations Security 
Council, China militarily preserving its influence sphere, and 
conflicts over climate change. It is hard to imagine much 
worse than that, but the worst-case scenario nevertheless 
succeeded in imagining fragmented technological prog-
ress fueling climate over-adaptation with disaster ensuing. 
In the four status quo scenarios, we tended to imagine an 
EU that was following its current policy course of gaining 
greater autonomy, closing itself off from the world in a bid 
to maintain continuity. Moreover, in the scenarios with the 
worst outcomes, we found that this was because the EU had 
added a geopolitical dimension to its current course, push-
ing through its autonomous priorities with geopolitical tools 
and in the face of resistance abroad and at home.
This leads to the fifth and final observation on the role of 
“chance.” Some of the scenarios relied on chance political 
shifts that open new perspectives – a Green president of 
France building climate cooperation with the MENA region 
together with China, or a new UK Labour government keen 
to work with the EU in foreign and security policy. Some 
envisioned a sequence of crises so severe that they need to 
be tackled jointly – such as coastal flooding that threatens 
not one but multiple nuclear meltdowns in China’s power 
plants – and whose successful management reignites de-
sire for multilateral cooperation. Conversely, some of the 
scenarios see events that unleash a negative domino effect, 
such as the dispute over the attribution of a cyberattack 
that ultimately breaks up NATO. The key takeaway here is 
that it is neither seemingly random events nor linear struc-
tural developments that determine in which position the EU 
finds itself in 2030 – but rather action. 
And so, to the feel-good part: developments are not inher-
ently bad or good; and the severity of a crisis does not nec-
essarily lead to a worse outcome. Instead, it is by the EU’s 
own action, at home and with other powers, that it can 
forge new paths and define outcomes. Europe’s investment 
in a capacity to act – building a capacity to react to external 
developments, act in the face of pressure, and shape its en-
vironments – will determine whether its reality in 2030 will 
come closer to a worst-case or a best-case scenario. And, 
across the scenarios, that meant upfront investment in do-
mestic and international dependencies and cohesion. Eu-
rope’s future is in its own hands. 
The only trouble is that such open-ended investments are 
becoming harder and harder to make in today’s world. And 
yet, the EU has a long history of carefully using connectivity 
and markets to build cohesion and “domesticate” the sourc-
es of conflict and crisis – a history that is being blanked out 
in Paris and Berlin amid calls for Europe to “become” geo-
political. Proponents of this agenda paint the EU’s past use 
of markets and economic interdependence as naïve in or-
der to justify it now closing itself off and trying unilateral-
ly to regulate globalization. As such, they risk ignoring the 
real path of EU history, which was one of reinvention and 
mixing and matching competencies across different policy 
fields. It is this long history of geopolitics that the EU suc-
cessfully tapped to achieve best-case outcomes.
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Today’s EU evidently believes that its regulatory clout is the 
primary means through which it can influence how dig-
ital technologies are used in the future, both in Europe 
and abroad. Therefore, this chapter presents three plausi-
ble scenarios for 2030 that each play out around two fac-
tors: the way the EU deploys its regulatory power and the 
global use of technology for geopolitical purposes. These 
factors reveal something unexpected – namely, Europe-
an innovation is what matters most. The EU cannot spread 
its cooperative and democratic form of order without in-
novating because its standards will mean nothing if its dig-
ital technologies are not taken up abroad. Simply leveraging 
the EU’s market size and the access of foreign-owned tech-
nology firms to EU consumers is an ever-diminishing form 
of power. Our scenarios demonstrate that the EU’s strat-
egy of being first mover when it comes to regulation – on 
data protection, social media platforms, and artificial intel-
ligence (AI) – too easily impedes its ability to innovate. If the 
EU continues to focus on a defensive regulatory policy, it 
will not only suppress innovation but also create negative 
knock-on effects for its whole foreign policy.
When it comes to the first factor – the way the EU uses its 
regulatory power to assert its standards internationally – 
the status quo scenario sees the EU quickly expanding its 
regulatory depth and reach through new tech rules, con-
sciously joining a global geopolitical battle to assert a liberal 
democratic tech space. However, its model of “democrat-
ic power” is top-down, and it chooses which businesses to 
support based on reasons of grand strategy. In the worst-
case scenario, the EU wisely focuses on building up trust 
among polarized EU citizens in order to maintain its ca-
pacity to regulate. But it takes a geopolitical approach, and 
its heavy focus on combating disinformation and hybrid 
threats only ends up distorting the European public sphere, 
deepening mistrust of technology and the state. Finally, in 
the best-case scenario, the EU concentrates primarily on 
ramping up investment and citizens’ adoption of tech, ral-
lying Europeans around flagship innovation initiatives such 
as the crypto euro of the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
Mars mission of the European Space Agency (ESA), and the 
Gaia-X infrastructure project led by Germany and France. 
Regarding the global geopolitics of tech, the status quo sce-
nario sees the United States toggling between internation-
alism and populism. Early cooperation with the EU around 
establishing democratic rules for the game soon gives way 
to tech protectionism and tit-for-tat retaliation. When the 
United States again moves back toward internationalism, 
it then cooperates on the rules of the internet and digital 
technology with an innovative China rather than a defen-
sive and unresponsive EU. In the worst case-scenario, Chi-
na emerges as the world’s tech innovation hub and, for 
commercial reasons, is supportive of EU attempts to cre-
ate a stable and cohesive regulatory space. As the European 
Digital Single Market fragments under polarizing political 
tendencies, however, China creates a “Beijing Effect,” har-
nessing its latest innovations to spread Chinese standards 
in Europe. The best-case scenario envisions cooperative 
solutions between great powers in the wake of infrastruc-
ture attacks in the United States and China. As Washington 
and Beijing recognize that their “Tech Cold War” is mutual-
ly debilitating, multilateral digital governance initiatives are 
revived. Both the EU’s innovative technologies and its nim-
ble rules are adopted or mirrored abroad.
WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR – 
TAKEAWAYS FOR POLICYMAKING TODAY
Is the EU properly braced for the worst case? This second 
scenario imagines, not implausibly, the dissolution of the 
EU’s ability to regulate at home as it is pried apart by ag-
gressive outside powers – all but ending its shaping power. 
China would not be able to achieve this kind of divide and 
rule were it not for the underlying tensions in Europe, ev-
As part of our research project to assess whether the EU is on the right course for 2030, this chapter looks at 
technology. By envisioning three scenarios for 2030 – a status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenario – we aim to 
ensure the EU is properly aware of the implications of continuing its current trajectory, is prepared for the worst, and 
understands how to achieve the best. While our group of experts has created scenarios based on multiple dynamics 
for us to use as a benchmark to monitor the EU’s progress over the next decade, we have cherry-picked a single one 
for this report and pulled out two of its key variables. The status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenarios outlined 
here each combine these variables in different ways and challenge the usually assumed cause-effect relationship 
between them, thereby highlighting new policy options that break old path dependencies in Brussels and Berlin.
Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030
17No. 13 | July 2021
REPORT
idenced by a significant rise of populist nationalism. Chi-
na exploits the divide, not only by supplying tech to private 
consumers but also by pulling groups of EU countries into 
its tech governance sphere. But, importantly, China starts 
to act in this aggressive way only when it perceives that 
Brussels has forfeited the trust of European consumers. 
Therefore, this scenario shows that diminishing the (digi-
tal) divides across Europe is the way to supply the neces-
sary resilience to withstand crises. The EU’s post-COVID-19 
industrial policy decisions will inevitably prop up old cham-
pions, but they must also create a landscape supportive of 
innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
across the EU. 
How might the EU work toward the best case? In this sce-
nario, the EU adopts a balanced approach to regulation 
and sparks innovation by means of a limited number of 
successful flagship projects. These innovation initiatives 
produce globally competitive technology and digital ser-
vices – as opposed to heavy-handed regulation or efforts 
to crown industrial champions. These competitive tech-
nologies, in turn, spur the development of innovative Euro-
pean tech norms, which allow the EU to take advantage of 
the change in global mood: a new win-win attitude toward 
cooperation in tech in the wake of severe crises. However, 
one key factor contributing to public support for the EU’s 
tech initiatives should not be forgotten – namely, that the 
digital divide among EU countries is bridged. This scenar-
io strongly suggests that societal trust in and understand-
ing of technology are at the core of the equation: The public 
and private sector jointly build rules, invest in education, 
and use tech to drive areas such as health and sustainability. 
STATUS QUO SCENARIO: THE EU’S 
AUTOCRATIC MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 
While the EU expands the ambit of its tech regulations and 
builds a nuanced framework of tech rules in this scenario, 
this does little to get domestic innovation to take off. That 
matters because its efforts are made against the backdrop 
of a global tech boom. The EU’s attempts to create home-
grown alternatives to US and Chinese technologies fail pri-
marily due to a lack of adoption in Europe – something its 
rule-making was meant to address. By 2030, the EU’s relative 
market size shrinks and, with that, its regulatory reach. Its 
top-down, ideological model of democracy promotion in the 
technological sphere suppresses innovation in Europe.
The EU’s Innovation Cannot Keep Up With Its Regulatory 
Ambition
As 2020 marks the start of a new decade, the EU recogniz-
es that digital technology will be the frontline in a global 
competition between liberal democracies and autocracies. 
Keen to protect European citizens, the EU makes full use of 
its market power to set its own ethical liberal norms for AI, 
cloud computing, industrial data, platforms, and competi-
tion. Landmark regulatory frameworks follow. In 2022, the 
European Digital Markets and Digital Services Acts come 
into force in record time. In 2023, two major revisions to 
the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation – an updat-
ed “GDPR 2.0” and specific new regulations on personal da-
ta and ethical algorithms for AI – are implemented. Large, 
non-European tech firms welcome these efforts because 
they are seeking precisely this mix of high standards and 
political predictability – and, so, start applying EU norms 
to their global operations. True, large US firms push back 
at the European Commission’s widely trailed intention to 
break up GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and 
Microsoft) in Europe. But Chinese platforms, which have a 
smaller share of the EU market, readily take on European 
market standards. 
Buoyed by this successful “scaling up” of EU democrat-
ic standards in what everyone in Brussels agrees is an un-
precedentedly hostile geopolitical situation, EU regulators 
make ever more robust tech norms on behalf of Europe-
an society. But this overconfidence and sense of mission 
cloud their judgment, and their early successes do not last. 
EU lawmakers label more and more fields of technology as 
strategically important for Europe. They attempt to pro-
tect European data flows and information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) infrastructure. But the effect is to 
cut the EU off – even from neighboring world regions. The 
Franco-German-led attempt to create a federated Euro-
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pean data infrastructure, the Gaia-X project, fails because 
it becomes too detached from its business, consumer, re-
search, and international stakeholders and simply does not 
align with the public interest. Most problematic of all, bu-
reaucratic rules impede start-ups, with knock-on effects for 
the stream of new technologies to Europe’s industrial gi-
ants. The EU’s share of the world’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) dips below 15 percent, a decrease of more than 5 per-
cent in just 10 years.
The EU as a Shrinking Global Partner
In 2021, the EU wholeheartedly supports the “Summit for De-
mocracy” convened by a Democratic US administration and 
bolsters the summit’s ambition to create multilateral initia-
tives to build democratic technical standards. However, giv-
en the huge geo-strategic stakes, Brussels and Washington 
each believes the other should subordinate its tech model to 
it. Their joint norms remain confined to small parts of the 
enmeshed transatlantic tech space – and the only thing that 
the United States and EU do enthusiastically cooperate on 
is naming and shaming autocracies. Therefore, the summit’s 
after-effects are neither sufficiently weighty nor inclusive 
enough to sway China. And this debacle for an interna-
tionalist US president’s diplomatic ambitions helps put an 
isolationist in the White House in 2024. This new US admin-
istration stirs xenophobic sentiment in America and, when 
barring foreign firms from its market, does not differentiate 
between Chinese or European tech products. Indeed, the EU 
is said to be the enemy of US Big Tech, intent on breaking up 
its sheer size, which is said to be the very source of America’s 
tech superpower in its grudge match with China. 
The global regulatory environment splits into two big blocs 
and a third, smaller one – around the United States, China, 
and the European Union, respectively. In response to the 
near-complete US market foreclosure, China bars all out-
side usage of personal and industrial data from the Unit-
ed States. But to justify these protectionist ends, Beijing 
adopts the language it learned from the EU in the early part 
of the decade – it cites, for instance, insufficient US data 
protection. As they close themselves off, each of the three 
markets sees technology as a domain of national security. 
They all accelerate investments into autonomous domestic 
AI, high-performance computing, and quantum technolo-
gies. The paradoxical effect of market closure is thus to fu-
el a global tech boom. In 2030, the global stock market also 
booms and the winners are tech companies from China and 
the United States – especially the Chinese internet-based 
companies Tencent and Baidu followed closely by the US 
leader in AI, Nvidia. When the United States finally veers 
out of isolationism and toward a further attempt to create 
a new international rules-based order, it works with a high-
ly innovative China this time rather than the sclerotic EU. 
The EU Turns Into What It Fears
The attempts early in the decade by legislators in France, 
Germany, and Brussels to pick “flagship democratic technol-
ogies” on behalf of European voters is sadly removed from 
real public demand. The EU is shaping its industrial policy 
along lofty ideological grounds, but, given the choice, Euro-
pean voters in fact pick up and adopt technologies that are 
made in the United States and China. Competition between 
the US and China – the two “tech workshops of the world” – 
is heating up thanks to their consumer-friendly approach-
es. The Chinese share of the global market is increasing 
thanks to the comparatively cheap systems it offers, which 
are snapped up by EU consumers, particularly those in re-
gions hit hardest by a slowing EU economy. The EU’s top-
down model of democracy leaves it prey to US corporate 
muscle and Chinese state capitalism. While Europe’s public 
sector-led tech initiatives fail to take off and appear ineffi-
cient, its private-sector tech is viewed increasingly critically 
– for its role in mining data and its insufficient containment 
of digital surveillance in markets outside Europe.
Despite a tech boom that has reached virtually every cor-
ner of the globe, Europe finds itself increasingly caught in 
between the two big players, both of them growing as they 
bite into the EU market. Because the United States and Chi-
na view control of the EU market as the “global kingmak-
er” to achieving tech supremacy, the EU finds itself staving 
off an increased number of foreign takeover bids on Eu-
ropean companies. Its weak position makes its few small 
contenders and then even its old champions ripe for the 
picking. Starved of a local innovation stream, Europe’s for-
mer prowess in engineering-driven manufacturing fades, 
and EU industrial champions struggle to adapt to the de-
mand for user-driven smart devices. Europe’s Daimler is 
taken over by China’s Baidu in 2028; and Volkswagen – soon 
to be grimly rebranded as the Chinese People’s Car – is next 
on the menu. The EU is not invited to the table when China 
and the United States declare a stalemate and agree to draw 
up the new rules of the game between them. The EU’s top-
down model of democracy even leaves its citizens receptive 
to autocratic norms from abroad.
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
In an increasingly securitized tech environment, the EU’s 
industrial policy efforts during the 2020s were too ideologi-
cal and heavy-handed; its few homegrown tech applications 
were not even picked up by consumers and businesses in 
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Europe. It focused on shielding its legacy industries from 
outside competitors, trusting too much in the incumbents 
to envision the disruptive innovations of the future. But this 
stifled start-up businesses, and the EU ended up making 
those legacy industries vulnerable to hostile takeovers. Its 
response to the growing geopolitical stakes was over-reg-
ulation, which further dampened Europe’s potential for do-
mestic innovation. In the long run, the shrinking EU market 
lost its position as a global actor and regulatory entrepre-
neur, and a lack of cohesion and diminishing level of trust in 
public-sector tech inhibited its natural advantages. There 
are lessons for how the EU might avoid this negative, sta-
tus quo trajectory. One is to rethink the EU’s efforts to inte-
grate its “new” policy priorities – such as the green agenda, 
as well as ethical and human rights aspects – into its regu-
latory expansionism. 
Our experts were not convinced that the Commission’s 
pitch for European tech – its unique selling proposition be-
ing its ability to shape “ethical” and “trustworthy” tech – is 
enough to generate a sufficient rate of tech adoption for 
European products and services to matter globally. Cer-
tainly, the EU should continue pushing for such standards, 
but high demand for accessible US and Chinese products is 
likely to persist. With a different industrial policy slant, the 
EU could raise trust in technology not only through regu-
lation but also by harnessing new technologies to ensure 
everyday benefits for citizens – for example, by investing 
in smart healthcare solutions to navigate the post-pandem-
ic world or supporting its multilateral environmental ef-
forts by investing in green technology. In this scenario, the 
EU’s efforts to rein in large tech “gatekeepers” did back-
fire somewhat, but largely because it occurred on ideologi-
cal and geopolitical grounds. Today, the EU can reduce the 
oligopolistic power of these companies, thereby reducing 
barriers to entry for smaller SMEs – and creating space for 
European firms to innovate in the process.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO: A QUESTION 
OF TRUST
In this scenario, the European Union again focuses on boost-
ing its capacity to regulate, this time channeling investment 
and research efforts toward technologies that promise to pro-
tect the European public sphere and build trust with voters. 
But the EU’s investment choices end up weakening its abil-
ity to handle crises, undermining societal trust, and stunt-
ing bottom-up innovation. Early on, politicians single out 
China as a source of disinformation and hybrid threats, fret-
ting about China’s weaponization of the World Wide Web. But 
China only unleashes a concerted influence campaign when 
it, too, has lost faith in EU regulators and wants to define 
their regulatory regime.
EU Elites Buy a White Elephant
In the early 2020s, a slow vaccine roll-out and a third and 
fourth wave of COVID-19 mutations roil Europe. In Central 
and southern Europe, governments blame the EU. In the 
northwest, a rump of centrist pro-European heads of state 
attempt to reestablish faith in the EU by way of a joint inno-
vation initiative. They blame the surge of populist, anti-EU 
sentiment on disinformation from China and argue that the 
lack of an “autonomous European sphere” leaves Brussels 
vulnerable and diminishes their ability to make and spread 
rules (the Brussels Effect). In 2024, a Danish “Commission 
Vice-President for a Sovereign and Prosperous European 
Industry,” along with a faction of Baltic and northern Euro-
pean states, pours euros and political capital into a flagship 
project – an autonomous European “Satellite Internet Infra-
structure.” Their intention is good: to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of EU internet-based services from external disruption 
while presenting a disruptive innovation for everyday use by 
EU citizens and companies. They promise disruption with-
out disturbance. But this – somewhat forced – investment 
does little that Europe’s old fiber optic cables could not and, 
ultimately, proves to be more vulnerable. Outside powers 
can now disable the whole EU without knock-on effects for 
other world regions.
Europe Succumbs to a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
European governments, lulled into a false sense of security 
by their satellite system, lag behind on message encryption, 
allowing US firms to intercept huge amounts of data. US-
EU relations take a hit, and large US companies are increas-
ingly hobbled by new European rules that specifically target 
their strengths. China sees that it can seize the crown of 
being the dominant global force in technology – providing 
the majority of critical infrastructure worldwide, supply-
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ing the most-used digital platforms, and setting techni-
cal standards. It pushes assertively westward, unleashing 
for the first time a concerted and heavy attack whose tar-
get is to undermine trust in European and US tech. Until 
this point, China has hugely profited from the EU’s stabili-
ty and unity, but these traits are gone. Chinese disinforma-
tion efforts, thus, find receptive ears: the EU’s policies have 
failed in what ought to have been their core aim – to en-
courage Europeans to adopt new technologies. Instead, the 
constant stream of warnings from Brussels has created mis-
trust in European and US technology, which stunts domes-
tic innovation. These developments pave the way for the “C 
Plus” approach now familiar from Africa and Latin America 
– China plugs itself into the European Union’s institutions 
and downloads Chinese rules. Young Europeans now snap 
up Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat.
Brussels Falls Into the Digital Divide
After the COVID-19 pandemic, EU innovation initiatives 
such as the satellite program only add to the uneven ef-
fects of its economic recovery package. Large companies 
from western and northern Europe continue to dominate 
the European tech market, while SMEs, start-ups, and re-
search centers in lower wage areas of the EU struggle to 
access resources, investment, and human capital. European 
efforts in the regulatory sphere prove to be simultaneously 
stifling for further innovation and toothless for truly reduc-
ing the market power of dominant companies. The EU’s dig-
ital single market begins to fragment because rule-makers 
focus on securing their regulatory power and neglect tech-
nological innovation. All this widens the digital divide in the 
electorate and eventually undermines any future rule-mak-
ing. Because populist-governed member states like Poland 
take a hawkish line on China while populist governments 
such as Italy’s argue for rapprochement with Beijing to ac-
cess its cheap tech, the EU finds itself unable to act. Para-
lyzed, elites from the EU’s northwest are unable to deliver 
on their priorities, reinforcing citizens’ skepticism. By 2030, 
right-wing parties gain significant margins in German and 
French elections. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
In this scenario, Brussels engaged in exaggerated “policy 
solutionism” – going into policymaking overdrive as if the 
solution were merely showing that it can set norms. The EU 
relied too heavily on regulation as the basis of its capacity 
to act instead of trusting in innovation and enhancing com-
petitiveness to strengthen its shaping power. This led the 
EU to make investment choices that support elite voices, 
only worsening centrifugal political forces. Its former profi-
ciency in crisis management has been equally lost. Its one-
off risky attempt to invest in satellite infrastructure has 
backfired, further eroding citizens’ trust in the EU’s ability 
to steer them through the next technological decade. China 
was able to push into the existing technological and socio-
economic divide, perpetuating a vicious cycle out of which 
the EU was unable to break, in which its faint efforts to en-
courage innovation were toothless, its regulatory power no 
longer applied, and, as a result, its population was less and 
less convinced of the EU’s benefits.
However, this scenario also illustrates some blind spots that 
may yield opportunities. If the transatlantic relationship de-
clines, for example, the EU has options. It can invest in new 
alliances, including with countries of the Global South. It 
can also position itself, once more, as a normative power 
striving for an ethically and equitably regulated tech world 
– by not only working with civil societies abroad where au-
thoritarian regimes have rigorously diffused Chinese sur-
veillance and law enforcement tech but also positioning its 
homegrown tech on global markets with their unique sell-
ing propositions. First, this approach could result in hu-
man-centered AI applications and health solutions with 
secure and safe data usage, the dimensions of which could 
be more boldly advertised by the EU to the outside world. 
Second, it can harness discontent with China’s “strings-at-
tached” cooperation in countries of the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI). This discontent could emerge in countries that 
accumulate debt or grow wary of deals in which a majority 
of rare earth supplies, which are relevant for high-tech pro-
duction, is sent to China. 
Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030
21No. 13 | July 2021
REPORT
BEST-CASE SCENARIO: THE EU RAMPS UP 
INVESTMENT AND RALLIES EUROPEANS 
AROUND FLAGSHIP PROJECTS
In this scenario, the EU is able to maintain its regulatory 
power and use its innovation potential to back cooperative 
projects. As digitization and tech adoption take off in the af-
termath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU picks up reforms 
that free investment. Importantly, these reforms enhance so-
cietal trust by both improving tech infrastructure cover-
age and implementing ethical regulation. Internal cohesion 
grows, populism decreases, and the EU gains new capacities 
for nimble norm-setting. Key innovative undertakings, such 
as Gaia-X, the ECB’s digital euro, and the ESA’s Mars program, 
build both trust in technology at home and European prestige 
abroad. Two severe cyber crises spur momentum for interna-
tional cooperation, and the EU is well placed to capitalize on a 
new win-win attitude among big powers in multilateral fora. 
Balanced Regulation and Innovation Breakthroughs 
By 2030, the EU is a fully-fledged technological peer of the 
United States and China, matching them in the number 
of essential patents and unicorns,203rates of venture capi-
tal, and attractiveness for ICT talent. Driven by the societal 
embrace of digitization in the aftermath of the COVID-19 
lockdowns, both technological adoption and investment in 
homegrown tech increase. A Europe-wide pension fund re-
form in 2022 allows more investment in start-ups. The Dig-
ital Single Market is completed by 2024, flanked by worker 
mobility measures attracting highly skilled labor to the 
EU. The EU has gone beyond regulatory-style reform with 
a number of flagship initiatives. These include the “digital 
euro” launched by the ECB in 2022, the Mars exploration 
program launched by the ESA in 2023, and breakthroughs 
in quantum technologies. The Franco-German-led Gaia-X 
project becomes a triumph of clever political-technologi-
cal design, providing the basis for an interoperable, secure 
cloud infrastructure – a federated system that has enabled 
a wide range of new services and providers through healthy 
competition. The system is adopted in third countries. As a 
result, other EU standards such as the “GDPR 2.0” are cop-
ied, giving EU tech companies a competitive edge. 
Crises Spur Multilateral Tech Cooperation 
In the run-up to 2030, the United States, China, and the 
EU recognize the risks of a potential “Tech Cold War.” In 
its place, a cautious mood of cooperation emerges among 
them. This switch toward cooperation is produced by a se-
20 Here, a unicorn refers to a privately held start-up company valued at over $1 billion.
ries of major crises. A sequence of severe cyberattacks dis-
rupts all of their communications infrastructures. After a 
hiatus in which all three feel they have improved their resil-
ience, a severe cyberattack hits a US nuclear plant. Experts 
from the EU and China offer to step in to help prevent a nu-
clear meltdown; their offer is rebuffed in Washington with 
obviously negative ramifications. As a result of the lessons 
learned from these crises, the EU, United States, and Chi-
na engage in mutual reassurance as well as joint standards 
that facilitate communication and data flows between conti-
nents. Thanks to a new era of digital diplomacy, the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union is revitalized and expanded 
to become a UN Digital Agency whose standard-setting 
prowess means it begins to supplement the United Nations’ 
slow-moving and expensive “analogue agencies.” In the wake 
of a global digital trade agreement, private companies from 
the EU, US, and China feel able to collaborate. An alliance 
among Huawei, Nokia, and Broadcom enables the deploy-
ment of high-speed 6G mobile internet, going some way to 
overcoming the global digital divide. 
The Digital Divide is Bridged and Trust Reestablished 
Thanks to this innovation drive and the Digital Single Market 
initiative, the digital divide across Europe is finally bridged. 
Fiber connectivity is available for all companies and private 
households and high bandwidth and low latency are stan-
dard. By 2029, broadband penetration has reached 99.9 
percent, and 5G is operational in both rural and urban ar-
eas throughout Europe, further driving innovation and new 
business models and helping Europe play to its strengths in 
the Internet of Things, robotics, health, mobility, and gam-
ing. As a result, overall political cohesion increases, and the 
EU is able to set rules quickly. Although technological break-
throughs are vast, society is not overwhelmed by disruption 
or data overload. Thanks to digital uptake, education has 
kept up with the needs of a new tech economy, labor laws 
have been adequately adapted, and new technologies such 
as AI are subject to appropriate and ethical regulation, sup-
porting everyday life. Governments and private companies 
have worked together to raise levels of trust. New oppor-
tunities emerge through investment in innovative technol-
ogies, including those related to global greening and the 
vanishing divide between the EU’s north and south. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
Viewed from 2030, it is clear how the right degree of reg-
ulation – together with a drive for innovation – can create 
virtuous cycles. Investing in a number of flagship projects 
Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030
22 No. 13 | July 2021
REPORT
early in the decade fueled the appetite in Europe for EU-
grown tech. While it took a number of worldwide crises to 
dampen global tech confrontation, these crises resulted in 
swift benefits and offered both political and economic op-
portunities. Ultimately, the EU’s regulatory power – though 
not asserted by Brussels on as great of a scale as in the sta-
tus quo scenario – in fact expanded because its initiatives, 
such as the digital euro and space program, were adopt-
ed or admired elsewhere, offering EU tech companies sig-
nificant advantages. This scenario is also characterized by 
trustworthy and affordable tech, with infrastructure pro-
viding beneficial access for everyone and enhancing EU 
cohesion. This, in turn, provided new opportunities for 
European business and freed capital to be invested into 
much-needed new carbon-neutral projects to feed the EU’s 
green agenda at home and abroad.
Although the sequence of events described in this scenar-
io was mostly highly positive, it might easily have had se-
vere downsides. The scenario required high-risk behavior 
to achieve its positive outcome. This scenario relied on 
the rallying effect of successful flagship initiatives. These 
achieved buy-in for the EU and its tech companies by im-
pressing consumers and governments. But success hinged 
on these initiatives actually taking off; a significant failure 
over the course of this decade might have had a reverse 
effect. Similarly, this scenario saw a high degree of soci-
etal acceptance of new tech, in which the benefits of an 
eased digital divide and balanced regulation created trust. 
But unprecedented degrees of technological disruption 
might just as easily have yielded a backlash against new 
types of tech-driven business models. Furthermore, the 
upsurge in innovation in the tech sector might easily have 
had an adverse impact on certain industries that were left 
behind, creating a challenge to EU cohesion. Finally, the 
cooperation in this scenario was catalyzed by major cri-
ses, leading initially to chaos, disruption, and mutual dis-
trust. Only because the EU, China, and the United States 
were sufficiently resilient were they subsequently able to 
work together.
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Geo-Economics in 2030: How 
the EU Can Squeeze Out From 
Between the US and China
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Geo-economics involves states using levers such as their 
control of natural resources and new technologies for 
narrow strategic advantage. It is something the Europe-
an Union and United States have tamed in the past, wield-
ing their market power to shape a global trading system 
in which even competitors share access to resources and 
innovations. But that system is being tested by US-China 
antagonism – at just the moment when technological and 
environmental changes unleash huge challenges. There-
fore, this chapter presents three plausible scenarios for 
geo-economics in 2030 that each play out around two fac-
tors: the character of US-China interaction and access 
to resources and new technologies. This reveals some-
thing unexpected. We show that, whether the pair coop-
erate or compete, the EU can still be frozen out of access 
to resource and tech. (Two obvious examples being a co-
operative “G2 arrangement,” in which China and the United 
States sew up the global economy bilaterally, and a compet-
itive G2 arrangement, in which the EU is stuck in between 
the US and China). Consequently, the EU has a vital inter-
est in shaping a trading environment that – regardless of 
whether big states cooperate or compete – contains strong 
mechanisms for the diffusion of resources and innovation. 
The first factor we explore is the style of US-Chinese inter-
action. In the status quo scenario, the United States and 
China compete aggressively. Each initially seeks to leverage 
the current trading system, but this robs the existing multi-
lateral system of its raison d’être. The historical advantages 
of the United States are eroded while China’s wide-rang-
ing “infrastructure diplomacy” leaves it well positioned to 
spread its rules in the emergent fields of information and 
communications technology (ICT) and renewable energy. 
The EU is split between the familiar norms of a weak al-
ly and the new obligations of an emergent challenger. The 
worst-case scenario foresees a far more cooperative in-
ternational environment – one based on China emerging 
as the sole global superpower, and the US pressed into co-
operation. Fearful of disruption and overstretch, this China 
promotes a cautious and oppressive model of trade. The EU 
finds itself drawn into China’s regulatory ambit. In the best-
case scenario, the United States and China cooperate but 
not in a collusive “G2” manner. Issue-specific policy allianc-
es emerge, and intellectual and industrial leadership is dis-
tributed widely – including to EU members.
Our second factor is access to resources and innovative 
new technologies. Although global innovation is high in 
the status quo scenario, the EU is unable to participate in 
the new breakthroughs. Innovation is driven by competi-
tion between two antagonistic blocs – one led by the Unit-
ed States, the other by China – that leverage their control 
of trade routes and, thereby, access to resources. The EU is 
doomed to be an innovation-taker, obliged to ally with one 
or the other – and increasingly split between the two. In 
the worst case-scenario, global innovation is low despite 
a cooperative international landscape. The United States 
is recovering from a lengthy economic crisis and no lon-
ger innovating. China has free reign to impose coopera-
tion agreements on third parties that contain obligations 
for Chinese access to their resources and their adoption 
of Chinese technologies. A fragmented EU duly signs up, 
limiting its own choices. The best-case scenario projects 
a high degree of global innovation that is evenly spread. A 
global web of multi-stakeholder networks, which include 
non-governmental actors such as research institutes and 
businesses, depoliticizes cooperation on big challenges like 
climate change and digital transformation and serves to dif-
fuse breakthroughs worldwide.
WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR – 
TAKEAWAYS FOR POLICYMAKING TODAY
Should the EU remain on its current geo-economic trajecto-
ry, the status quo scenario for 2030 looks gloomy. This sce-
As part of our research project to assess whether the EU is on the right course for 2030, this chapter looks at 
geo-economics. By envisioning three scenarios for 2030 – a status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenario – we 
aim to ensure the EU is properly aware of the implications of continuing its current trajectory, is prepared for the 
worst, and understands how to achieve the best. While our group of experts has created scenarios based on multiple 
dynamics for us to use as a benchmark to monitor the EU’s progress over the next decade, we have cherry-picked a 
single one for this report and pulled out two of its key variables. The status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenarios 
outlined here each combine these variables in different ways and challenge the usually assumed cause-effect relation-
ship between them, thereby highlighting new policy options that break old path dependencies in Brussels and Berlin.
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nario projects a weak EU that is busy navigating between a 
highly competitive United States and China in the key fields 
of ICT and green adaptation. While EU member states do 
initially enjoy the freedom to pick and choose between the 
two when it comes to cooperation, each choice has sizeable 
consequences for the medium term. Stuck in reactive mode, 
the EU misses the chance to put forward a European mod-
el that differs from that of the United States or China – a 
collaborative regulatory environment prone to innovation 
in ICT and green industries. By 2030, the EU lacks its own 
home-grown transformative technologies in fields includ-
ing energy storage, hydrogen technologies, quantum com-
puting, and artificial intelligence (AI) and loses its leadership, 
even in established industries like the automotive sector. 
With the EU caught in a vicious cycle of low innovation and 
high dependency, internal polarization deepens. Its damag-
ing dependence on China and the United States leaves the 
EU a weak geo-economic power that is not ready to com-
pete and unable to cooperate as an equal partner. 
The EU will be in greater trouble when trying to weath-
er the worst-case scenario. It foresees a near-unipolar 
Chinese-led order into which the United States is be-
ing gradually co-opted. By itself, the EU is unable to ex-
ert geo-economic influence; yet to link itself to its US ally 
and decouple itself from Chinese trade in both ICT and en-
ergy technologies would only be to back the losing horse. 
Inevitably, more and more EU countries follow the United 
States and make their peace with a Chinese-led order that 
promises a kind of stability and solidarity. They lock them-
selves into Chinese data-cloud solutions and other high-
ly intrusive infrastructure. A global Pax Sinica emerges to 
offer a cooperative global order, but only once China has 
thoroughly transformed the EU’s entire culture and poli-
tics. This dire long-term eventuality once again underlines 
the need for the EU to build a European model for ICT and 
green industries. It also puts into perspective the initial re-
taliation that moves toward such a model could incur – an 
uptick in the incidence of hybrid threats, cyberattacks, and 
the theft of intellectual property, as well as an occasional-
ly violent scrabble for resources in the EU’s neighborhood. 
If the EU is to work toward the best-case scenario, it must 
consider the importance of effective multilateral organiza-
tions and global governance platforms as well as the costs 
of their absence. But – and slightly contradicting this – the 
prerequisite for this scenario is the EU building an indepen-
dent capacity to act. Such a capacity necessitates the EU’s 
ability to counter geo-economic warfare and overcome its 
structural dependencies on third countries for new critical 
resources. Greater European cohesion and autonomy are 
not ends in themselves but should help the EU to continue 
driving multilateral organizations like the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) to be more inclusive and better at produc-
ing tangible outcomes. In this scenario, the EU substantially 
invests in public-private partnerships to boost digitization 
and green innovation. Old fault lines – for instance, between 
the United States and China, democracies and authoritarian 
powers – are softened by successful issue-specific coopera-
tion on green innovation. India reaches out to the EU, seeing 
it as a sympathetic partner when it comes to ensuring ac-
cess to resources and diffusing innovation. 
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STATUS QUO SCENARIO: IN A HIGHLY 
COMPETITIVE, HIGHLY INNOVATIVE 
LANDSCAPE, THE EU STRUGGLES TO 
SURVIVE
US-Chinese competition sharpens in a scenario character-
ized by geo-economic power games over rare earths and criti-
cal natural resources. Traditional multilateral institutions like 
the WTO fall short in dispute settlement and standard-setting, 
becoming a mere playground for great power competition. The 
EU fails to hedge against the loss of US influence within the 
WTO through new diplomatic démarches to Asian democra-
cies and autocracies. China, on the other hand, consolidates its 
strengths in all world regions, including Europe. Because Eu-
ropean business is kept busy navigating between US and Chi-
nese sanctions regimes, even European legacy industries like 
the automotive sector start to misfire.
Multilateral Bodies Are Squashed as the US and  
China Wrestle
The WTO is mired in disputes with “emerging economies” 
like China and their claims for greater representation. In 
2023, it looks set to get ahead of the problem by securing 
a mandate to negotiate rules for e-commerce and green 
technology, focusing on emergent fields in which some 
measure of equal representation can be ensured from the 
outset. But China refuses to apply free trade principles to 
new fields while its old grievances remain. And the United 
States, falling irrevocably out of love with the WTO, starts 
acting unilaterally. Washington uses secondary sanctions to 
crush trade with countries it perceives as too friendly to 
China and its energy needs – notably, Iran and Russia. Chi-
na follows suit and uses sanctions to isolate a group of key 
US allies that has opened full diplomatic relations with Tai-
pei, the semiconductor king. Amid these competing sanc-
tions regimes, any remaining credibility that the WTO had 
as a forum for dispute resolution and standard-setting 
evaporates. Smaller countries are the first to feel the ef-
fects. Disempowered by the absence of effective collective 
action structures, they are left to fend for themselves be-
tween China and the United States.
As WTO standards break down and the United States and 
China compete, relative advantage is decided by each su-
perpower’s ability to secure critical supplies. The United 
States cashes in on certain historical advantages – for ex-
ample, its position as guarantor of the open global econo-
my, in particular through its rules for cross-border trade 
and finance and the global internet. But China gradual-
ly gains advantages via the infrastructure strategy epito-
mized by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, the 
transactional Chinese diplomacy on display during the 
COVID-19 crisis has become routine in the 2020s, a decade 
of pandemics and natural catastrophes. When a bird flu 
epidemic emerges from the Amazon, Beijing provides local 
governments with aid in return for valuable primary sup-
plies of lithium, cobalt, and graphite – resources that are 
required to build batteries and electrodes and, thus, vital 
to green innovation. China cements this with investments 
in green infrastructure, helping Latin American govern-
ments adapt to the demands of a 2021 Conference of the 
Parties (COP) summit dominated by the United States and 
European Union. The US regresses from status quo power 
to spoiler when it tries to stir up local resistance in Central 
America to China’s extractivism.
Innovation is Dynamic – but Decoupled Between China 
and the US and Between Green Technologies and ICT
Overall, there is a high degree of global innovation despite 
the breakdown of the WTO – or perhaps because of it. In-
novation is driven by the emergence of two trading blocs 
that compete for gains and thrive in emergent sectors and 
the unregulated global environment. Both the United States 
and China cite raison d’état for taking innovation risks that 
are sometimes unethical and for developing technologies 
that are specific to their individual cultures. Their compe-
tition leads to the compartmentalization of research and 
investment, in turn preventing the diffusion of new good 
practices and shared regulatory standards. ICT innova-
tion and green adaptation become the two fields of pres-
tige and power – ICT because the United States is able to 
harvest vast amounts of data from its legacy internet plat-
forms; climate adaptation not least because China uses its 
access to Latin American resources to launch a new “green 
e-mobility” initiative. While the United States funnels dwin-
dling subsidies to ICT firms and cuts back on funding for 
green innovation, China invests heavily in the development 
of low-cost electrocars and batteries. 
With a global economy increasingly driven by Chinese-style 
green innovation and energy efficiency, the United States 
ends any commitment to an open global economy. A new, 
protectionist administration erects trade barriers in an at-
tempt to safeguard its legacy ICT companies from Chinese 
competition and directs its efforts toward supporting its 
domestic oil producers. It is this protectionism that pro-
vides the motivation for the United States to instrumen-
talize sanctions and secondary sanctions: Since assuming 
power in 2025, this administration has been seeking to iso-
late rival oil producers in Russia and Iran, as well as erst-
while allies in the Middle East. Collaterally, the US sanctions 
also serve to put pressure on its own allies to cease busi-
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ness dealings with China’s satellite states and China itself. 
The United States also boycotts Chinese green technology 
in a further move to revitalize domestic fossil energy gen-
eration. The impact of this protectionist impulse is glob-
al and results in a failure to share innovative responses to 
problems that require global collective action such as cli-
mate change. China achieves breakthroughs in energy tran-
sition, but they come too late given that climate change is 
already highly advanced. 
Europe is Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place
The European Commission – encouraged by France, Ger-
many, and the Nordic and Baltic countries – tries to keep 
up with the competing superpowers. It introduces poli-
cies to reshore production even from its own neighbor-
hood and creates European champions in both ICT and 
green innovation. But as the United States uses the world-
wide web to harvest data for its domestic tech sector and 
China sews up global supplies of green resources, the EU 
finds itself cut off from the resources it needs for domes-
tic production. The EU is increasingly dependent on both 
actors – the US for ICT innovation, China for green adap-
tation – and desperately tries to rebuild its internation-
al supply and production chains. But, with each attempt, 
its corporate sector is struck by Chinese and US sanc-
tions. To its own frustration, the EU can clearly envisage 
the new, uniquely European instruments required to cre-
ate a distinctive model of collaborative innovation but can 
no longer achieve sufficient unity to adopt them. Staring 
defeat in the face, Brussels tries to align the EU with US 
regulatory standards, seeing the wisdom of hooking in-
to its ICT models, but poorer southern and southeastern 
member states are attracted by Chinese-led innovations 
that drive down energy costs. As its southern and eastern 
neighbors become locked into Chinese infrastructure sys-
tems and technologies, so too does the EU.
The EU is still capable of competing with the United 
States and China thanks to a few incumbent advantages. 
The field of e-mobility is fertile ground for technological 
breakthroughs, and the EU has a huge legacy advantage 
thanks to its automotive sector. But this advantage, too, 
is gradually eroded by its inability to access resources as 
well as diverging risk cultures in its member states, and 
lengthy, state-heavy coordination processes. The German 
automotive sector thus fails to move from engineering and 
precision technology to user interface and systems-driv-
en tech. By contrast, China, just three years after launch-
ing its “green e-mobility” initiative, sees its efforts pay off 
with a breakthrough in battery technology in cooperation 
with a Brazilian firm. While China’s innovation in energy 
storage crowns its global leadership role in green adapta-
tion, Europeans cannot even reproduce technologies that 
build on Chinese breakthroughs. That is because, although 
Beijing makes a great show of opening up the patents, it 
simultaneously restricts the EU’s access to resources vi-
tal for their production. The EU fails to carry over its lega-
cy advantage into a new phase of industrialization, having 
cut itself off from human and natural resources even in its 
own neighborhood. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
Facing fierce competition for supplies of primary goods 
and resources, the EU proved itself a weak contender. Al-
though the European continent is poor in key natural re-
sources, Brussels nevertheless tried to gain autonomy and 
competitive advantage by reshoring production. By con-
trast, China, despite being relatively resource rich, invested 
in partnerships and forged strong interdependence. These 
activities reached into Europe’s neighborhood, and Beijing 
capitalized on the fact that the EU had regarded its sur-
roundings as more of a threat and less of an opportunity for 
too long. Decreasing intra-EU cohesion and capacity to act 
were the logical results – and these meant it failed to di-
vert from this trajectory. The EU should really have used 
the inward orientation of the United States and the weak-
ened structure of multilateral institutions like the WTO to 
break from past path dependencies and locked-in relation-
ships and alliances. This would have given the EU a chance 
to build new coalitions and partnerships and ramp up co-
operation on obvious thematic challenges like ICT innova-
tion and green transition. 
In short, the EU had an opportunity to make the best of an 
unfortunate situation, moving out of its comfort zone of 
muddling through and piggybacking on the United States. 
It might have built up a larger circle of like-minded coun-
tries with access to critical resources and human capital, 
including Australia, Canada, and Japan, not to mention the 
countries of its southern and eastern neighborhoods and 
traditional European partners across Latin America and 
Africa. If EU member states had invested in an open and 
collaborative model of production and diversified their in-
ternational relationships, they could have built on the EU’s 
existing reputation as the normative leader in the ethi-
cal application of new technologies and fighting climate 
change and created entrepreneurial international institu-
tions. By diversifying its relationships, Europe could have 
rendered itself less vulnerable to US-Chinese confronta-
tion, in turn reducing its need to act as a collective when it 
came in contact with other powers’ technologies, innova-
tions, and standards. 
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WORST CASE SCENARIO: TO ACCESS 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES, EUROPE IS 
DRAWN INTO A CHINESE SPHERE OF 
INFLUENCE
China is permitted to evolve into an unrivaled global super-
power, combining supremacy in the field of ICT and control 
over resources critical for the green economy. A United States 
that never properly recovered from COVID-19 retreats from 
multilateral governance and reaches an accommodation with 
Beijing, driving one EU member state after another into Chi-
na’s arms. Global governance structures like the WTO simply 
cease to matter, except as fora for China to radiate influence. 
Under heavy financial pressure, member states propose se-
vere cuts to EU funding; as a result, disintegrative tendencies 
grow. Europe opts for a closer alliance with China, robbing the 
EU of any remaining credibility as a liberal regulatory power. 
Regional and Global Institutions Are Subject to Chinese 
“Venue Shopping”
The United States never recovered economically from its 
“long Covid” and is struggling to uphold American repre-
sentation in the WTO, Bretton Woods organizations, and 
beyond. An opportunistic Beijing has been out “venue shop-
ping” – not only in the usual sense of looking around for the 
best institutional venues to achieve its policies but also ac-
tively buying allegiance. As the WTO loses the active back-
ing of the United States, it becomes dependent on Chinese 
budgetary support to maintain its secretariat. A similar dy-
namic also comes to define regional organizations like the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 
the Horn of Africa whose policy output is soon strongly in-
tertwined with BRI structures and standards. The US-led 
G7, by contrast, simply melts away when China unleashes 
sanctions on Australia and New Zealand. The G7 grouping, 
formerly labeled the “Economic NATO,” never had a secre-
tariat, legal personality, or even official membership – and 
it shows. Over the heads of its allies, the United States now 
finds itself reaching a cooperative accommodation with 
China. China asserts its supremacy over global investment, 
trade, and economic rule-setting without a struggle.
Innovation Remains Low and Compartmentalized  
Despite a Cooperative US-China Regime
The replacement of the WTO system by a G2 arrangement 
puts a dampener on global efforts to share resources and 
innovation. The United States lost its appetite and capaci-
ty to innovate long ago. In the early 2020s, US internet plat-
forms cracked down on the alt-right. These political radicals 
simply resorted to low-end closed subscription platforms 
to organize a backlash. When they rampaged through the 
Googleplex in Silicon Valley, seeking out “Asian program-
mers,” they dented the attractiveness of the United States as 
a destination for highly skilled tech workers. Shanghai has 
become the world’s alternative tech Mecca. Its major sell-
ing points are a top-notch infrastructure, ample supplies of 
state capital, and the lack of ethical constraints on innova-
tion. But Shanghai encourages innovation only enough to 
cement China’s global hegemony and never so much that 
it might disrupt stability. China generously rolls out 6G 
infrastructure to Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, 
complemented by “cooperation” agreements cementing a 
totalitarian “Industrial Internet of Everything.” This is “tech 
trap diplomacy” – China giving technologies away at cost 
price but then straight-jacketing recipients into new sys-
tems. At the end of the decade, almost despite itself, China 
achieves a breakthrough in quantum computing and, typi-
cally, sees this as a way to control the pace of global change. 
A Fractious Europe Finds Unity with China
US society is polarized, the G7 states have scattered, and 
the EU is divided. In this context, Western states find the 
stability and certainty provided by China attractive. Some 
EU member states – including the New Hanseatic League 
consisting of the Netherlands, the Baltic and Nordic states, 
and Ireland – remain hawkish toward China, but they alien-
ate their closest partners by advocating an 80-percent 
reduction of funding for EU Common Agricultural and Co-
hesion policies. Societies in poorer, geographically pe-
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ripheral EU states begin looking eastward for access to 
resources and cheap tech and take up the offer of Chinese 
friendship. One after another, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Bul-
garia, Romania, Croatia, and Greece opt into the BRI digital 
network and China’s “integrated Balkan innovation hub.” By 
2027, Greece is openly saying that it is impossible to main-
tain close ties to both China and the EU given their reg-
ulatory differences. It debates GREXIT. These moves are 
greeted with horror by hawkish states like Czechia and Po-
land, but, having lost faith in an EU model of cooperation, 
they push for a return toward national priorities. In 2028, 
a slim majority of member states proposes to find a way to 
harmonize the EU single market and the Eurasian Econom-
ic Union, now under unofficial Chinese leadership. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
In this scenario, the EU hastened its own marginalization 
through both its hesitancy and dependency on China for 
stability, solidarity, and cohesion. Scared by the perspective 
of being shut out from global ICT infrastructures and not 
achieving sufficient breakthroughs of its own in green inno-
vation, the EU quickly gave up on its own ambitions in inno-
vative research and development and began to disintegrate 
before being reassembled and stabilized along Chinese lines. 
More and more EU member states preferred the outlook of 
China-led global stability at the expense of liberal values 
and standards. The decision by a group of wealthy, hawkish, 
liberal member states to punish their poorer counterparts 
for adopting Chinese technologies by withdrawing funding 
from intra-European cohesion policies backfired badly. In 
a Chinese-led world, the EU remained a relevant actor but 
only by adopting Chinese standards wholesale. 
Countering the Chinese tech trap required the EU to take 
decisions of strategic importance more quickly and in a less 
risk-averse fashion. Only then could the EU have built on its 
traditional industrial strengths and achieved breakthroughs 
in areas like biotech, green energy, or health tech innovation. 
European success stories would, in turn, have made it easi-
er to attract capable human capital to the EU, with migration 
establishing itself as an opportunity not a threat. More-
over, European countries needed to invest greater resources 
and diplomatic efforts into effective international organiza-
tions and resilient, diversified partnerships with like-mind-
ed countries. Beyond the United States, such efforts ought 
to have included not only Europe’s neighborhood but also 
countries like India, Japan, Canada, or those in Latin America 
– just as in the previous scenario. To achieve all this – from 
the capacity for nimble decision-making to the openness to 
a full range of outside players – it needed to invest in EU Co-
hesion and Structural Funds. 
BEST CASE SCENARIO:  
A COOPERATIVE WORLD ORDER 
BASED ON GREEN RULES
The use of coercive geo-economic levers is minimized by the 
spread of issue-specific cooperation platforms. Incentives for 
international cooperation are carefully ramped up by stake-
holder coalitions. Topics insulated from great power com-
petition – such as the resilience of global value chains for 
climate adaption – build interest-led cooperation between 
the United States and China. Businesses and researchers 
play a crucial role in facilitating the diffusion of ICT and 
green technologies. This positive experience spills over to 
other areas of trade. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the EU heavily invests in strengthening European re-
silience and intra-European cohesion, allowing it to build 
domestic – and then global – coalitions.
Enhanced Multilateral Responses Encourage Innovation – 
with India at the Center
Amid a slow global recovery from COVID-19, resource-rich 
countries across Africa and Latin America had been bank-
ing on a new commodities “supercycle” fueled by a re-
surgent China and India. Instead, India suffers a series 
of severe climate-induced droughts and food shortag-
es whose effects ripple out globally, resulting in shortag-
es of critical products. Indian small businesses now frame 
climate change as the “biggest non-tariff barrier” hamper-
ing prosperity. In the shell of the old Indian Congress Party, 
a new inter-caste green alliance emerges and puts pres-
sure on the government. Its big idea: using crowd intelli-
gence for climate adaptation – green tech married with 
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open ICT platforms. New Delhi bends to the pressure and, 
when it hosts the 2023 G20 summit, it pushes for a Glob-
al Green Fund (GGF) to encourage green innovation and 
ICT roll-out. This support for cross-border public-private 
partnerships is an implicit acknowledgment that the G20’s 
intergovernmental methods have failed to resolve the big 
global issues. India has long blocked WTO reform, but its 
usual sticking points have dissolved. It can hardly maintain 
protections on its agricultural sector when its food stock-
piling policy failed so badly in the drought; and it can hard-
ly maintain protections on its ICT sector if it wants a new 
approach to climate adaptation.
Positive Spill-Over Effects from Green Tech Cooperation 
Toward Other Areas
Traditional  conf l ict l ines in the WTO soften and 
long-overdue reform agendas become feasible. In 2023, 
the WTO points to the need to deal with new fields such 
as e-commerce and green tech but acknowledges that the 
usual intergovernmental negotiations will not suffice. Its 
secretariat designs a rolling multi-stakeholder approach 
that goes beyond its usual annual Public Forum and gen-
erates new practices and standards over time. A new glob-
al alliance for research and innovation emerges, which 
grows in members – soon also including Chinese compa-
nies afraid of missing out on cooperation opportunities. It 
helps, of course, that Chinese President Xi Jinping has to 
step down in 2025 citing health reasons. His exit may be 
more than coincidental, however, since the Chinese Com-
munist Party felt him to be out of step with the new global 
mood of cooperation. The new Chinese leadership begins 
to look upon multilateral frameworks as something more 
than just a means to project its domestic order. In 2026, 
the New Delhi round of WTO negotiations on sustainabil-
ity and digital rules starts. In it, China is finally willing to 
move forward in reforming the system of industrial subsi-
dies. Four years later, negotiations on resource access and 
innovation are concluded. 
The EU Establishes a More Open Form of Geo-Economics
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU heav-
ily invests in strengthening societal resilience and cohe-
sion. This helps it use economic recovery schemes more 
effectively to speed up the roll-out of its digitization and 
interconnectivity strategies, as well to create incentives 
for skilled European workers to return to the EU from the 
United States and Asia. Tech and green innovation hubs 
flourish in Central Europe; starting from a low base, they 
boost local support for the EU. As Central European coun-
tries join the euro, they kickstart a debate about how to 
raise the currency’s international status, thereby increas-
ing the EU’s heft as a trading power and extending it to fi-
nancial markets. The reform process starts in 2025 when 
the EU holds a convention for a new treaty. This convention 
is followed by a genuinely inclusive consultation process, 
making not only a proper banking union possible but also 
the introduction of qualified majority voting on sanctions 
on states that weaponized the global economy. In 2028, the 
new treaty enters into force. The year 2030 sees the Tes-
la Gigafactory outside Warsaw achieve a breakthrough in 
energy storage technology – the result of US-Polish-Indi-
an collaboration. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
This scenario sees the EU in a strong position, faced with 
a favorable international environment catering to its 
strengths. Credible and dynamic multilateral and inter-
national cooperation with strong networks of non-gov-
ernmental actors allowed European countries to adopt 
intellectual leadership in advancing the digital and green 
transition. Due to the fact that innovation came from 
transnational consortiums, including non-state actors 
from the business and research sectors, smaller Euro-
pean countries like the Nordic and Baltic countries were 
able to take leadership roles in the green transition and 
tech innovation despite their limited power capabilities 
as state actors. The EU also highly benefited from inno-
vation and integration beyond Europe due to open data 
flows, best practice sharing, and overall high rates of in-
novation diffusion. 
However, even in this positive scenario, climate change-re-
lated risks remained high despite successful collective ac-
tion. Countries like the United States, China, or India were 
especially at risk of being hard hit and potentially bring-
ing back protectionist approaches. This optimistic scenar-
io shows how crucial domestic factors were to creating 
positive spill-over logics in international cooperation and 
how easily they could be reversed, making the interna-
tional system highly volatile. It is notable how many of the 
best-case scenarios in this booklet begin with a crisis or se-
vere disruption, and how much of the EU’s ability to with-
stand these crises and adapt in a positive way comes down 
to its investments in intra-European relations, infrastruc-
ture, and societal cohesion. Putting in place this kind of 
bottom-up capacity to act is apparently important even 
in fields like climate change – fields where disruptions are 
easily foreseeable and usually prepared for by top-down re-
structuring processes.
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE GEO-ECONOMICS SCENARIOS
2020 2030
EU climate and tech 







EU pours COVID-19 
recovery funds into 
European cohesion
Drought in India 
and China
Xi Jinping steps down; 
India steps up and requests 
Global Green Fund 
China takes over 




world’s tech mecca 
and norm-setter
China rolls out international 
6G infrastructure with 
cooperation agreements
Southern Europe aligns 
with cheap Chinese 
tech, alienating North EU members cohere again 
under Chinese leadership
Decade of pandemics 
and natural catastro-
phes begins
Emergence of two 
hostile trading blocs 
(US and China)
US excels at tech; 
China leads on 
climate adaptation
Northern Europe aligns 
with US, South with China
Failure of WTO talks 
on emerging tech and 
climate trade
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Left Blank on Purpose
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The Global Conflict Landscape  
in 2030: The Imperative of  
Investing in Security Cooperation
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The three scenarios for Europe’s future security landscape 
play out around two themes: climate change (specifically, 
how states respond to the potential of climate change to 
drive both innovation and conflict) and security coopera-
tion (how the major powers treat multilateral cooperation 
in security and conflict resolution). In Germany and the EU, 
climate change is currently treated as the biggest emergent 
driver of war and insecurity because failing to adapt to cli-
mate stress leads to resource conflict, power grabs, mass 
migration, and the collapse of cooperation. Since the quali-
ty of global security cooperation is currently worsening, the 
EU is logically pursuing unilateral policies in fields that in-
clude climate innovation – for example, its Green Deal and 
decision to create legally-binding climate targets. Play-
ing with plausible variations of the two factors, we suggest 
that the EU has things the wrong way round. Investments 
in European adaptability and high unilateral climate com-
mitments will not help reduce conflict. In order to boost in-
ternational climate adaptation and avoid climate-induced 
conflict, the EU should invest in global security cooperation. 
Let us start by exploring how our first theme – climate 
change – plays out across our scenarios. In all three, the 
EU responds to climate pressures by setting itself high le-
gal targets, yet this leads to negative security outcomes un-
der most circumstances. True, in the status quo scenario, 
the EU is initially protected from security problems thanks 
to its high level of climate ambition, but not for the expect-
ed reasons. Eco-extremists worldwide punish their govern-
ments for timidity when it comes to adaptation and point to 
the EU as an example to aspire to; the EU’s high climate am-
bitions protect it from criticism but unwittingly spur these 
extremists to acts of violence abroad, and instability eventu-
ally spills into Europe. The worst-case scenario also shows 
the perils of too much unilateral climate innovation. The EU’s 
unilateral standard-setting cannot prevent over-adaptation 
in Asia and the Middle East, causing negative side effects for 
other world regions as experiments in geo-engineering dis-
rupt the environment. The best-case scenario shows that 
climate innovation works primarily in tandem with strong 
security cooperation. Governments begin to think of “cli-
mate adaptation” less in terms of goal-setting and more in 
terms of revamping cooperation in sensitive spheres.
This leads us to our theme of multilateral security coop-
eration. In the status quo scenario, multilateralism fatigue 
and a degradation of global security institutions height-
en the escalatory potential for old and new conflicts. The 
EU’s focus on unilateral initiatives initially boosts its resil-
ience. But, over time, its under-investment in multilateral 
formats leads these global and regional institutions to be-
come sclerotic, allowing violence and insecurity to spread 
to Europe. In the worst-case scenario, multilateral security 
institutions like the UN are superseded and give way to re-
gional orders under assertive hegemons. This fuels forms of 
local adaptation, innovation, and deregulation in Africa and 
the Middle East – but of an extremely risky kind. By con-
trast, the best-case scenario demonstrates how severe en-
vironmental crises can result in positive developments as 
global powers reinvigorate security and conflict resolution 
institutions to deal with them. This indicates that an EU in-
vestment in multilateral security cooperation has greater 
benefits for absorbing the drivers of conflict than unilateral 
standard-setting and adaptation.
WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR – 
TAKEAWAYS FOR POLICYMAKING TODAY
In the status quo scenario, European policymakers would 
probably predict two things for the EU of 2030. First, that 
investment in initiatives such as the Green Deal and Euro-
pean green transformation will make it well placed to lead 
globally on the drivers of conflict such as climate change. 
And, second, that this unilateral investment will signifi-
cantly allay any future security problems for Europe itself. 
As part of our research project to assess whether the EU is on the right course for 2030, this chapter looks at 
security. By envisioning three scenarios for 2030 – a status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenario – we aim to 
ensure the EU is properly aware of the implications of continuing its current trajectory, is prepared for the worst, and 
understands how to achieve the best. While our group of experts has created scenarios based on multiple dynamics 
for us to use as a benchmark to monitor the EU’s progress over the next decade, we have cherry-picked a single one 
for this report and pulled out two of its key variables. The status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenarios outlined 
here each combine these variables in different ways and challenge the usually assumed cause-effect relationship 
between them, thereby highlighting new policy options that break old path dependencies in Brussels and Berlin.
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These predictions are partly borne out by this first scenar-
io. Although the EU is initially spared violent conflict, this 
is less due to the practical effects of its policies and more 
because of their signaling effects. In this scenario, citizens 
worldwide react with anger – and then violence – against 
governments that take approaches deemed too timid to 
tackle climate issues. The EU is initially spared this new 
“eco-extremism,” which mostly plays out in the cyber realm. 
And yet, the EU’s unilateral progress and its correspond-
ing under-investment in global cooperation is partly to 
blame for frustrations outside of Europe. Moreover, when 
it comes to its investment in security cooperation, the EU’s 
failure to renew its usually inventive, grassroots approach 
to security governance leaves it poorly placed to address 
these grievances when they do strike the continent. 
In the worst-case scenario, Brussels’ starting point is more 
positive than in the status quo scenario, in which it was fo-
cused heavily on itself. But its good intentions to ensure 
that its climate policies are more inclusive and cover not 
only the EU but also its eastern and southern neighbor-
hoods backfire. Its effort at including its neighbors is mo-
tivated by geopolitical considerations and forms part of a 
bid by the EU to promote regional orders as a useful coun-
terfoil to China and the United States, who are polarizing 
global affairs. The EU fears a hot war between the two pow-
ers, possibly triggered by an attempt by China to annex Tai-
wan. So it is ironic that, in this scenario, there is indeed a 
Chinese move to seize Taiwan – and, importantly, it occurs 
precisely because of a growing regionalization of world af-
fairs. In this world order, which is characterized by weak 
global security cooperation, the United States and China 
tacitly accept each other’s spheres of influence, and China 
considers, as it does now, Taiwan to fall within its zone. The 
EU is relieved never to be asked to take sides between the 
two; yet it receives help from neither the United States nor 
China as Russia asserts its own influence in Eastern Europe, 
the Balkans, and the Middle East.
What is the best-case scenario – and is it achievable? Our 
experts foresaw such hoped-for outcomes as states shar-
ing methods of climate adaptation and agreeing on a global 
approach to other big, shared problems like nuclear prolif-
eration as well as Europeans finally speaking with one voice 
on such matters in robust global institutions like the UN. 
This sounds implausible from today’s perspective. Further-
more, the steps taking the world in this positive direction 
in this scenario often involved “lucky coincidences” – such 
as a radical or cash-poor UK Labour government dropping 
Britain’s nuclear capability, leading to greater streamlin-
ing of the European presence in the United Nations Securi-
ty Council (UNSC) around the E3 (the format of France, UK, 
and Germany). And yet, the EU is able to capitalize on these 
unexpected shifts for structural reasons. In this scenario, it 
had already invested in international security cooperation, 
be it the E3 with the UK or more established multilateral 
bodies. This kind of structural preparation left it well placed 
to turn climate disruptions into opportunities for adaptation.
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STATUS QUO SCENARIO: INVESTMENT IN 
EUROPEAN RULES AND ADAPTIVENESS 
CANNOT STAVE OFF DISASTER
The United States and China withdraw from global securi-
ty bodies despite growing threats to the cross-border infra-
structure on which their economies depend. In the absence 
of fora for mediation, border confrontations and inter-eth-
nic tensions sizzle. US and Chinese refusal to invest in mutu-
al reassurance spills over into multilateral governance more 
generally; a lack of cooperation on adaptive technologies 
leaves weak states vulnerable to extreme weather events and 
resource shortages. Grievances around the timidity of climate 
policies, the unequal benefits of foreign direct investment, and 
excessive resource extraction are given form by new political 
groups. Organized eco-extremists unleash large-scale cyber-
attacks on infrastructure from Baku to Berlin. 
Talk of a New Cold War 
An unreformed and sclerotic UNSC epitomizes ten years 
of under-investment by the United States and its allies. A 
cash-strapped US has to choose priority issues, and con-
flict resolution is not one of them. As for China, its econo-
my quickly recovers from the COVID-19 crisis, and it talks 
of investing in conflict prevention and mediation tools. In 
reality, China’s cash investments in global institutions like 
the UN are primarily geared toward co-opting their upper 
management into silence. Beijing’s main engagement is in 
economic standard-setting and investment bodies like the 
International Organization of Standardization, and it nom-
inates proxies from friendly nations to top positions. China 
is trying to secure its global web of cross-border infra-
structure through such moves rather than peacekeeping. 
The United States does not counteract this creeping influ-
ence because it is keen to reduce its financial burden and is 
itself increasingly reliant on China’s worldwide network of 
roads, ports, and hubs. 
As China’s economic and diplomatic clout grows, it uses 
unilateral displays of military force to prove its capabili-
ty to secure its worldwide networks, testing the readiness 
and cohesion of its rivals with provocations off the Sprat-
ly Islands, Paracel Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal. A 
2022 US-China standoff in the South China Sea ends with 
both sides backing away. Shortly afterward, China skir-
mishes with an Indian naval exercise in waters it has 
claimed for itself and, in what is becoming a pattern, the 
United States and its allies do just enough to face down 
China without pushing it to kinetic action. It is a tense 
environment characterized by frozen conflicts at risk of 
thawing and latent ethnic tensions. But whenever such 
tensions look set to explode, China leverages its web of 
cross-border infrastructure to isolate states one by one. 
In a typical move, when inter-ethnic tensions lead to con-
frontation at the India-Pakistan border, China – worried 
by two nuclear capable powers squaring off – turns off the 
tap to both, squeezing their reliance on the China-Paki-
stan Economic Corridor. 
The Growth of Grassroots Eco-extremism
The United States and China refuse to set ambitious cli-
mate goals, viewing these as a burden that they cannot af-
ford given the geopolitical stakes. Instead, each seeks the 
allegiance of industrializing nations across Asia and Africa, 
prioritizing support for their economic development over 
global climate standards. This takes its toll. Extreme weath-
er events and a shortage of fresh water and arable land lead 
to tensions in South Asia and the coastal areas of Africa. In 
the Sahel, resource shortages contribute to tensions be-
tween nomads and herders. And on the Horn of Africa, ris-
ing sea levels threaten the livelihoods of urban populations, 
trapping poor populations in precarious situations and 
leaving them without the means to move. Crucially, there 
is no global or regional institution or hegemon with the will 
or capacity to resolve these conflicts. The response to Hin-
du-Muslim riots in northern and eastern India is typical: 
Beijing quickly smothers the social unrest by directing its 
local service providers to cut off power and the internet; 
yet it does not address the underlying problem of food in-
security brought about by droughts and flooding.
China cannot keep the lid on this pressure cooker forev-
er. Across sub-Saharan Africa, groups that feel trapped be-
tween Chinese market interests and the status-quo-driven 
self-preservation of their national governments conduct 
physical attacks on Chinese-built infrastructure. A wave of 
cyberattacks against Beijing follows and is traced back to 
hacking centers in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Mean-
while, in advanced economies, frustration over the timid-
ity of global climate mitigation measures yields new kinds 
of civil protest and political extremism. A wave of copy-
cat strikes hits infrastructure – first in China, then in the 
United States, and finally in the European Union. A global-
ly organized network of “eco-extremist” groups emerges to 
claim responsibility for this series of attacks. The stricken 
governments find it impossible to disentangle these radical 
groups from the governments offering them support. Tehe-
ran, Pyongyang, and Moscow, for instance, all feel insecure 
in a global economy whose infrastructure remains open un-
til one of the bigger powers decides to close it off. 
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Heavy EU Investment in Climate Adaptation and  
Mitigation Does Not Suffice
In the early 2020s, the EU not only invests in ambitious uni-
lateral climate adaptation but also signals that it will share 
its distinctively European technologies and approaches 
if others sign up to its standards. The idea is that, by ex-
porting its own cooperative approach to climate change, 
cross-border infrastructure, and resource issues to other 
governments, it could achieve a more secure internation-
al environment. Europe’s ambitious policies initially spare 
it from the global wave of eco-extremist violence, but – far 
from having a pacific effect abroad – such policies actual-
ly fuel violence as frustrated urban groups across Africa and 
Asia point to the EU and its Green Deal to criticize their own 
governments. Meanwhile, environmentalists in Europe grow 
frustrated at the EU’s timid position on climate geopolitics. 
At the Conference of Parties (COP)-34 held in Brussels, the 
EU fails to take a stand as China freezes Taiwan and its few 
allies – a scattering of low-lying Pacific islands like Tuvalu – 
out of the UN climate talks. European eco-terrorists unleash 
cyberattacks on EU institutions and coal-guzzling EU mem-
bers with close ties to the United States or China, starting 
with an attack on Poland and its energy grid.
In the mid-2020s, the United States completes its “piv-
ot to Asia”; seeking to bolster friendly states in the East, it 
scales down its involvement in NATO’s military structures. 
The US does remain allied to select European states, rep-
licating in Europe the “hub and spokes” set of bilateral al-
liances it has long had with individual nations in East Asia. 
Although US power projection continues to offer the EU 
protection from armed invasion, almost all EU members ex-
perience cyber- and hybrid attacks – with Russia the main 
suspect. Some Europeans respond with “extreme deter-
rence” in cyber space, but the drawbacks of this aggressive 
new approach quickly become apparent. Warsaw attribut-
ed the cyberattack on its electricity grid to Moscow, but it 
was claimed by eco-terrorists who had not been active on 
European soil so far. The incident went on to create splits 
between those European governments preferring extreme 
deterrence and those favoring a more cautious approach. In 
the wake of its very public indecision and lack of cohesion, 
NATO is downgraded from a collective defense alliance to 
a coalition of states willing to engage in deterrence against 
hybrid threats. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
The crumbling of old fora for conflict resolution created a 
global vacuum, but the EU’s failure to pursue its usually in-
novative approach to geopolitical tension and social gov-
ernance meant it was poorly placed to fill it. Finding itself 
surrounded by political timidity regarding climate ambitions 
and aggressive extractive strategies, the EU looked inward, 
focusing on domestic standard-setting and climate adapta-
tion in the hope that it could entice other governments to 
adhere to its norms. In fact, the EU’s attempt at global cli-
mate leadership only fueled violent and disruptive protests 
in other world regions and rendered governments there 
even less responsive. The EU soon found itself marginal-
ized and losing its economic clout. But this negative expe-
rience did highlight some potential wins that the EU could 
already anticipate today. Given the difficulty governments 
worldwide will face when it comes to agreeing on drivers of 
conflict such as climate change, it is likely that there will be 
widespread anti-fossil fuel and pro-democratic movements. 
Our experts felt that the EU was well-placed to shift paths, 
away from standard-setting power and toward green power, 
moving from harnessing markets to social movements. 
In this scenario, the EU did indeed develop policies that ap-
pealed to new social groups at home and abroad, and this 
gave it new levers in foreign policy vis-à-vis authoritarian 
countries. It was one of the few powers with the potential 
to support “human” and “societal security” that were dis-
tinct from more autocratic models of “regime” or “state se-
curity.” There was significant global demand for just such 
a security approach in 2030 – or, more accurately, for any 
approach capable of addressing the root causes of conflict. 
In our scenario, the UN and NATO were rendered all but 
irrelevant when it came to conflict resolution, and the EU 
had an opportunity to become more active. However, this 
demanded that the EU invest not only in international secu-
rity cooperation but also in its own defense. Learning from 
the large-scale cyberattacks it suffered during the 2020 to 
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2021 COVID-19 pandemic, the EU had an opportunity to de-
velop a robust cyber defense model and to encourage dig-
ital security cooperation. But because it failed to invest in 
security, its leadership role in the field of climate became 
a liability. Autocratic regimes saw the EU’s appeal to social 
movements as a threat and did their best to undermine it. 
Eco-terrorists then turned their fire against Europe for its 
geopolitical timidity.
WORST-CASE SCENARIO: 
REGIONALIZATION LEADS TO RADICAL 
UNCOORDINATED EXPERIMENTATION
In 2030, global security institutions give way to regional or-
ders. Regional powers lay claim to their own geographic and 
technical spheres of influence with the tacit approval of their 
peers in other world regions. Inevitably, conflict bubbles up 
– nowhere more so than in East Asia, where China annex-
es Taiwan, and Japan responds by becoming a nuclear power. 
As a result, global governance on pressing problems requiring 
collective action breaks down. This proves devastating in the 
field of climate mitigation. In the absence of common inter-
national goals, uncoordinated technological innovation and 
over-adaptation prove worse than collective inaction, ulti-
mately exacerbating the potential for climate-related conflict.
Global Governance Collapses and Is Replaced  
by Regional Hegemons
Beginning in the early 2020s, China and the United States 
take an increasingly selective approach to multilateral fo-
ra, reducing comprehensive global rules-based bodies 
like the UN to mere shells. As these global bodies become 
polarized between the two superpowers, local rivalries 
between regional powers boil up with the belligerents en-
joying tacit encouragement from Washington or Beijing. 
The situation deteriorates into a fourth Gulf War that is 
sparked as Saudi Arabia and Israel confront Iran. Its effects 
radiate out into other world regions. In Latin America, for 
instance, Brazil comes to the fore as its petro-econo-
my benefits from the Gulf crisis, and it takes an assertive 
stance in its region, inhibiting environmental protection 
and human rights governance as well as blocking relevant 
initiatives on the global level. Soon, the world is divided 
into familiar, old geographic spheres of influence. These 
form the basis for new “technospheres,” which experiment 
around the local mix of resources and geographic features. 
Semi-developed regions that benefited from the former, 
rules-based global order respond to the economic hit with 
drastic deregulation as they try to attract businesses and 
powerful allies. 
Uncoordinated Technological Innovation  
Exacerbates Climate Conflicts
All parts of the world agree that climate change is the ma-
jor challenge they face, but they cannot agree on common 
measures to respond. Each regional technosphere has its 
own particular “innovation mix” and, freed from any glob-
al regulatory oversight, presses ahead unilaterally with 
climate adaptation and mitigation. The resulting break-
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throughs in climate adaptation are uncoordinated and 
sometimes excessive. As climate challenges grow, hard-hit 
regions become more risk tolerant, further deregulating 
and offering themselves to large outside powers as test-
ing grounds for new climate approaches. An American cor-
poration, emboldened by the US withdrawal from the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity, begins geo-engineering 
by means of high-altitude stratospheric aerosol injection. 
Ethiopia offers the Horn of Africa as a testing ground. By 
2030, the negative side effects of this climate engineering 
have created “death zones” in the southern Mediterranean, 
rendering large areas of the region uninhabitable. Conflicts 
and refugee flows are largely contained to the region itself, 
but neighboring powers put up barriers and cut off aid and 
climate cooperation. 
Russia Plays Divide and Rule in Europe 
Early in the 2020s, the EU begins investing in cooperative 
regional orders as a buffer against the breakdown of glob-
al institutions. It redoubles its investment in its own neigh-
borhood, ensuring that its Eastern European, North African, 
and Balkan neighbors can fully participate in its post-Covid 
recovery stimulus and Green Deal. It fears that they will oth-
erwise be drawn into hostile spheres of influence. But this 
worldwide regionalization turns sour when China claims 
hegemony over East Asia and annexes Taiwan in a “Velvet 
Revolution,” claiming it as part of its regional sphere of in-
fluence, while Japan, lacking reassurance from outside part-
ners, chooses the nuclear path. It turns sourer still when an 
emboldened Russia asserts its own sphere of influence, jus-
tifying it by pointing to the EU’s geopolitical assertiveness 
and brokering a formal division of Ukraine into two sepa-
rate states. Faced with competition from Russia, the EU not 
only increases its neighbors’ access to European Green Deal 
funds but also cuts the usual strings attached. The result 
is a growth of corruption, kleptocracy, and unresponsive 
strongmen regimes living off large-scale energy infrastruc-
ture projects that Moscow can exploit even further. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
The world was prone to new and more escalatory conflicts 
as climate and security issues intertwined. The most obvi-
ous example was the way unregulated geo-engineering in 
the Mediterranean led to a whole new class of man-made 
security problems. But there was also the case of Israel 
and Iran. Before fighting erupted, there was renewed nu-
clear proliferation. The belligerent states claimed to be 
harnessing nuclear technologies for the purposes of en-
ergy adaptation but were really seeking new means of de-
fense and regional prestige. Moreover, by appealing to 
climate goals to legitimize such actions, Israel and Iran 
provided outside powers like the United States and Chi-
na with an excuse to pass them sensitive technologies. 
Instead of focusing on global security governance, how-
ever, the EU concentrated on shoring up its own regional 
stability. It chose an assertive geopolitical approach. Like 
other powers, the EU linked its climate and security poli-
cies in new and instrumental ways. It invited its neighbors 
to sign up to its Green Deal, supposedly to ensure mutual 
connectivity and joint adaptation, but really to use them as 
a buffer to a hostile world.
As a long established regional power, the EU might have 
seized upon these developments to redefine its global role 
– using the weakness of the United States and China to es-
tablish deeper global security governance. However, it was 
unprepared. Throughout this booklet, it is telling that most 
scenarios have assumed the rise of China and have pro-
jected a global order structured either around the United 
States and China or around China alone. That suggests that 
Europeans rarely consider the eventuality that both the US 
and China might undergo internal crises and lose power. 
But in this scenario, that is precisely what happened. Both 
the United States and China suffered domestic pressures 
as their civil populations voiced discontent with the effects 
of climate catastrophe and avoidable conflicts. Reduced in 
status, the US and China needed support to rise to the oc-
casion. A former spoiler state such as China would have had 
to behave well in areas in which it claims influence – for 
example, stepping in to defuse an India-Pakistan confron-
tation. The EU could have seized such opportunities to sup-
port global security cooperation. It did not.
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BEST-CASE SCENARIO: SEVERE CRISES 
SPUR COOPERATIVE ACTION FROM OLD 
AND NEW PLAYERS
A succession of severe natural catastrophes affects different 
parts of the world simultaneously. Global superpowers are 
left looking helpless. Authoritarian governments – including 
Beijing’s – whose legitimacy lies in decisively resolving prob-
lems that require collective action feel especially powerless. 
China, like the United States, is forced to accept help from 
rivals. Democratic and authoritarian countries find ways to 
engage in cooperation formats based on narrowly defined 
issues, such as that between the EU and China on battery 
technology or between the US and China on technological in-
novation. Mutual reassurance in the security sphere paves 
the way for institutional breakthroughs such as UN-level tech 
governance and joint climate adaptation programs.
Security Cooperation Appears All But Extinct
The 2020s begin with a high-profile European initiative for 
a multilateral rapid reaction force for climate catastrophes, 
which almost immediately stalls due to rivalry between Chi-
na and the United States. Global security cooperation de-
creases sharply, and a gap emerges between traditional 
multilateral institutions – the UN and Organization for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – and rival global 
governance initiatives such as China’s BRI, the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank, etc. When links are discovered 
between the US Department of Defense and UN research on 
geo-engineering, China accuses the United States of “weap-
onizing the weather.” Meanwhile, the United States accuses 
China of using its lead role in renewable energies to control 
key rivers and seas worldwide. Their sparring is interrupted 
by a set of almost simultaneous catastrophes. Severe wild-
fires burn in Silicon Valley and huge storm waves hit China’s 
rim of nuclear power plants from Hongyanhe down to Fang-
chenggang with spillover effects reaching as far as the litto-
ral areas of India. Then, a massive oil spill occurs in Siberia, 
which is blamed on the refusal of the United States to desig-
nate biological and cultural protection areas to prohibit the 
use and transport of heavy fuel oils for shipping in the region. 
The Big Powers Bind Together
Chastened by these catastrophes, the United States and 
China seek to reestablish their global reputations by notch-
ing up some successes in global governance. This involves 
cautiously engaging in mutual reassurance in key geograph-
ic domains and sensitive technologies. The establishment 
of “open technospheres” – global commons mixing shared 
geographies and technologies – turns out to be key to 
successful climate adaptation. Seeing advantages for them-
selves, Beijing and Washington sponsor climate-related 
technological research in all domains: space (using satellite 
data to monitor temperatures on earth), air (carbon cap-
ture), cyber (5G-based smart energy grids), land (AI-driv-
en reforesting), and sea (floating photovoltaics). As solving 
global problems becomes a matter of prestige for the two 
big powers, global power hierarchies are eased. Both the 
United States and China embrace “multi-stakeholderism” in 
climate governance – the US in order to bring in non-state 
actors and China in order to insert state-backed business-
es into discussions. A more relaxed China-India relationship 
reactivates BRICS, a group comprised of Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, China, and South Africa, as a more robust tool for shap-
ing global developments.
Stakeholders Rise to the Occasion 
In 2030, BRICS demands the reform of the UNSC with the 
aim of better geographical representation. Measured in 
narrow terms, this is yet another example of how the EU is 
losing power to new stakeholders. But Europe is prepared 
for this. The UK and France trade in their seats among the 
P5 – the five sovereign states to whom the UN Charter of 
1945 grants a permanent seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil that also include China, Russia, and the United States – 
for a sole European (UK/EU) seat. Chance political shifts in 
Europe allow for this trade. The UK elects a radical Labour 
government in 2024 that drops British nuclear capability on 
grounds of ideology and cost. And, in 2027, the Green pres-
ident of France brokers the EU-China agreement on new 
energy technologies in a constructive exchange that has 
positive implications for other fields affected by the liber-
al-authoritarian divide. This global diffusion of power paves 
the way for a second flagship EU initiative – the establish-
ment of an “International Court for Crimes against the Cli-
mate.” China, negatively affected by the Siberia disaster, and 
the United States, still angry at the Chinese nuclear disas-
ter, lend their support to the initiative, even if their own 
participation remains open. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
At first glance, this seems an unlikely scenario, rendered pos-
sible only by a series of “lucky” coincidences. In it, multiple 
natural catastrophes were required to hit both China and the 
United States to make them seek help and trigger change. 
European policymakers have always had a habit of kidding 
themselves that states will rise to the challenge in this way 
as global collective action problems become greater. But bit-
ter experience suggests that the bigger problems like climate 
change become, the more states and individuals retreat into 
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self-interest, free riding, and symbolic sovereignty. Against 
this backdrop, what – if any – lessons could the EU learn to 
work toward this best-case scenario today? The obvious one 
is that investments in security cooperation mattered. Secu-
rity cooperation preceded successful climate adaptation. The 
positive outcomes would have been impossible without pre-
vious heavy investment in security cooperation that spilled 
over into different areas. Although the engagement of more 
actors in global security cooperation meant that the EU lost 
relative power in terms of its traditional economic compe-
tencies, it was able to advance on new issues. 
This scenario spawned three further lessons. First: narrow, 
issue-based cooperation resolved certain problems but 
meant that underlying dynamics were not always addressed. 
Cooperation on technical problem-solving supported the 
EU’s highly focused green agenda but sacrificed the goal 
of promoting democracy and human rights. Despite such 
a sacrifice, the EU was obliged to maintain technical coop-
eration with authoritarian regimes. Had relations on larger 
issues like climate change remained untested, they would 
have presented opportunities for misunderstandings and 
conflict. Here, too, security cooperation and mutual reas-
surance mechanisms would have helped. Second: as ideas 
and global investments flowed into its neighborhood from 
outside of the EU, its capacity to act there decreased. But 
the EU was right not to panic and act in a proprietori-
al manner there. The EU’s standard-setting model was re-
newed as more actors joined in to shape shared standards. 
Last: by moving forward on an issue-based cooperative 
agenda, the EU and United States enhanced their capaci-
ty to engage with China. The transatlantic security relation-
ship improved because it moved beyond burden-sharing 
disputes toward new areas of engagement. 
Source: Authors’ own work
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Left Blank on Purpose
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Global Migration in 2030:  
Time To Take Africa Seriously 
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The EU has come to believe that it is boxed in. Although 
its set goal is to attract desirable forms of labor to Europe, 
its efforts to open itself up in order to compete for global 
migration appear to create pull factors for nearby irregular 
migrants. Due to its proximity to Africa, the EU seems un-
able to make itself more attractive to outsiders without at-
tracting a disproportionate wave of unskilled migration and 
refugees from its southern neighbors. Our three scenarios 
for 2030 test that proposition by offering different combi-
nations of two variables: EU policies to compete with the 
world’s other regional labor markets and levels of irregu-
lar migration to Europe across the Mediterranean. One of 
these scenarios suggests that the EU can attract the peo-
ple it wants without attracting unwanted migration from 
the South. But this requires the EU to remedy a blind spot – 
its failure to recognize Africa as an attractive regional labor 
market in its own right. Rectifying this, our exercise sug-
gests, would help the EU strike the right balance of interna-
tional competition and cooperation in its migration policies.
The first variable we explore is the EU’s policies to compete 
with other regional labor markets. In the status quo sce-
nario, the EU finds itself competing against China through 
its use of transactional migration partnerships while Beijing 
leverages elite access to Chinese universities and its labor 
market to gain favorable trading conditions and access to re-
sources in Africa. In the worst-case scenario, regional labor 
markets become infused with geopolitical and ideological ri-
valry, and the EU competes by turning its free movement ar-
ea into a kind of European civilizational zone – defined by a 
sharp dividing line with Africa. In the best-case scenario, de-
veloping economies cooperate with neighbors to retain local 
labor and stave off attempts by outside powers to play divide 
and rule. The growth of attractive regional labor markets in 
Africa does not come at the cost of the EU’s access to labor. 
The EU now feels confident to pursue global skills partner-
ships and circular migration deals, reassured that this will 
not lead to mass migration from across the Mediterranean.
Our second variable is levels of migration. In the status quo 
scenario, there is a surge in refugee flows. As the EU and 
China compete with one another to offer bilateral part-
nerships to African states based on elite visa opportuni-
ties, governance problems there sharpen. The EU becomes 
populist and unattractive to global labor. The worst-case 
scenario sees a huge surge in irregular migration from Afri-
ca. North African elites have turned away from the EU as it 
hardens its southern border, but they open their countries 
up to immigrants from the south, seeing this as a way to 
build relations with regional blocs in West and East Africa. 
These African governments, in turn, simply use Morocco as 
a bridge to push their workers toward Europe, and Moroc-
co does little to hold them back. In the best-case scenario, 
there is a dip in disorderly migration as the EU stops using 
its visas, trade, aid, and diplomatic and crisis-management 
tools in pursuit of transactional migrant deals in North Af-
rica. Instead, it deploys them for their proper purpose – ad-
dressing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Sahel. 
WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR – 
TAKEAWAYS FOR POLICYMAKING TODAY
What costs should the EU be aware of if it sticks to the tra-
jectory mapped out in the status quo scenario? This first 
scenario projects an EU whose prime aim is to reduce irreg-
ular migration, yet it fails to wean itself off its reliance on 
an annual influx of informal labor. While this EU of 2030 is 
undergoing major transformations – economic, geopolitical, 
climate-related, digital, and demographic – politicians fail 
to adopt an overarching strategy in which migration plays a 
role. Consequently, clamping down on migration becomes an 
end in itself. The EU fails to build up reliable skills partner-
ships around major issues such as technology and climate; as 
irregular migration flows become even more unpredictable, 
it struggles to harness the usual pool of irregular labor for its 
low-wage sectors, namely healthcare and agriculture. All Eu-
As part of our research project to assess whether the EU is on the right course for 2030, this chapter looks at global 
migration. By envisioning three scenarios for 2030 – a status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenario – we aim to 
ensure the EU is properly aware of the implications of continuing its current trajectory, is prepared for the worst, and 
understands how to achieve the best. While our group of experts has created scenarios based on multiple dynamics 
for us to use as a benchmark to monitor the EU’s progress over the next decade, we have cherry-picked a single one for 
this report and pulled out two of its key variables. The status quo, worst-case, and best-case scenarios outlined here 
each combine these variables in different ways and challenge the usually assumed cause-effect relationship between 
them, thereby highlighting new policy options that break old path dependencies in Brussels and Berlin.
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ropeans suffer from the abdication of political responsibility 
for migration – both those EU citizens trapped in disadvan-
taged situations and those ambitious young Europeans seek-
ing opportunities in other parts of the world. 
Is the EU properly braced for the worst-case scenario? 
In many ways, this is the wrong question: The EU’s threat 
perception is already so heightened that its fears could 
become self-fulfilling. In this scenario, the EU takes a de-
fensive Eurocentric approach to migration, hemming itself 
in with deals with authoritarian governments. As a result, 
the EU misses opportunities. As its neighbors work to keep 
regional labor flowing in the wake of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the EU is slow to see the growth of attractive re-
gional labor markets. It is also slow to note how the gap is 
closing between the Global South and Global North when it 
comes to migration priorities, meaning that all states have 
some interest in regulating emigration, entry, and returns. 
Moreover, the EU is slow to acknowledge how migration 
has become overlaid with ideological overtones, making it 
a key component in the reshuffling of strategic alliances to 
counterbalance China. 
How might the EU work toward the best-case scenario? 
Here, the European Union is able to escape from the vicious 
cycle in which only defensive border security and transac-
tional deals are options – the toxic side effects of which for 
good governance, regional cooperation, and, ultimately, mi-
gration control lead the EU to seek more of the same. In-
stead, the EU is finally able to opt for reform both at home, 
with efforts to deepen the European labor market, and 
abroad, with a shift in the nature of its border condition-
ality and the launch of skills and talent partnerships that 
promote inter-regional mobility. This is possible due to a 
combination of two factors: first, confidence gained in com-
peting against China for migration and, second, the emer-
gence of vibrant regional labor hubs in the South and in 
West and East Africa. These developments turn a vicious cy-
cle into a virtuous one. No longer fearing instability beyond 
– and pressures on – its borders, the EU stops using its var-
ious tools as leverage in migration deals with the effect that 
it actually ends up reducing migration. 
STATUS QUO SCENARIO: THE EU TRIES 
TO OUTCOMPETE CHINA AND DISASTER 
FOLLOWS
China’s comprehensive “Silk Road Migration Plan” offers 
elites in Africa access to its universities and labor market, as 
well as lucrative infrastructure projects, in return for strate-
gic resources. The EU thus finds itself competing with a more 
impressive power both globally and in its near abroad. Its 
past refusal to advance multilateral cooperation forces it to 
stick to deal-making with strongmen in Africa, only creating 
more instability around itself. Disappointed with the buffer-
ing deals the EU brings to the table, potential partners are no 
longer interested when the EU finally proposes more equita-
ble partnerships. The EU finds itself economically weak, di-
vided, and facing a surge in migration. 
China Uses Migration Deals in Africa to Gain Standing 
and Resources
Following a decade of US sanctions, China identifies serious 
deficits in its capacity for innovation and access to strategic 
resources. Therefore, it rolls out a set of transactional deals 
in developing countries designed to plug these gaps. Chi-
na’s deal-making focuses on elites in Latin America, Africa, 
and Central Asia where it offers government officials and 
their families access to Chinese universities and businesses 
– a system dubbed “diplomatic visa liberalization.” China’s 
goal is to weaken the ability of regional bodies like the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to shape poli-
cies that retain skilled workers and bargain collectively over 
resources. It focuses on transnational resources such as 
fish, water, and hydroelectric power. If a particular govern-
ment resists its bid for its national resources, China simply 
waits until these have crossed the border into the territo-
ry of a neighbor. Its tactic in each world region is divide and 
rule – even in its connectivity efforts. 
China’s talent acquisition programs may use the familiar 
US-style language of “competing for the brightest and best 
minds,” but they reflect a much deeper geostrategic sensi-
bility. The EU sets itself on a similar path. While it also talks 
of attracting the brightest and best through its revamped 
Blue Card program, the EU actually focuses on the mecha-
nisms of multinational corporations (MNCs) and intra-cor-
porate transfers. It makes use of Mode 4 trade rules to allow 
certain highly-skilled self-employed individuals to establish 
their businesses in Europe; it gives individual EU regions 
and cities access to its infrastructure spending; and it en-
courages these to make mobility agreements with nearby 
regions – especially those of a similar language group. Its 
Jean Monnet and Marie Curie Talent Programs cultivate ed-
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ucational links abroad, particularly in fields in which it is 
struggling to access materials like semiconductors and in 
countries rich in minerals and raw resources. The EU is go-
ing head-to-head with China, using the offer of elite gain 
and access to Europe not only to boost its own innovation 
profile but also to navigate a world in which access to re-
sources and markets has become trickier. 
No Leverage, No Interest: Neighbors  
Increasingly Ignore the EU 
If African elites readily engage with China, it is because they 
are already accustomed to its style of transactional bidding 
for their human and natural resources. Although the EU has 
talked up its support for African “collective action” for years, 
it makes bilateral deals around migration and resources. Po-
litical and business elites in East and West Africa welcome 
the competition provided by China and start a kind of in-
ternational bidding war for their allegiance. Alongside ac-
cess for themselves to European or Chinese markets, they 
demand infrastructure investment from Brussels and Bei-
jing with no political conditions attached. When European 
governments suggest they lack the financial firepower to 
keep up, local governments suggest “sanctions forgiveness” 
– pressing the EU to “cash in” by lifting the targeted personal 
sanctions it has imposed over the previous decade. The re-
sult is a fragmented and top-heavy order in Africa in which 
governments sell regional public goods – fisheries, wa-
ter, transport networks, and political ownership of region-
al bodies and migrants – for individual gain.
Too late, the EU notes that the situation across Afri-
ca is deteriorating sharply. Elites across the Sahel, wor-
ried about large numbers of disgruntled, underemployed 
young men, take advantage of their control of transport 
infrastructure and regional free movement regimes to 
nudge them abroad. In response, the EU makes a series 
of buffering deals with local governors in African states 
that cut deep into the continent’s overlapping free move-
ment zones. While Italy makes buffering deals with militias 
and criminal gangs with the tacit approval of the Nether-
lands and Germany, Brussels puts a range of sanctioning 
regimes in place to punish leaders who do not play ball 
and take back their nationals and those of neighboring 
states. The trouble is that these leaders lack legitimacy at 
home and would further strain relations to their neighbors 
if they took back foreign nationals. In this context, Chi-
na positions itself as a benevolent power, voicing calls for 
debt relief from European governments and delivering avi-
an flu vaccines and other healthcare products to stricken 
regions. The EU, by contrast, is associated with a rapa-
cious form of neo-colonialism. 
The EU Strives for Autonomy
In the early 2020s – after a decade of crisis, from the euro-
zone to the coronavirus – the EU deepens its industrial pol-
icy, fiscal stimulus programs, and harmonization of national 
labor market institutions. This creates the basis for a tru-
ly European labor market policy with a proper assessment 
of Europe’s skill needs. The resulting assessment leads it to 
a two-pronged approach. First, it ramps up the automation 
of low-skilled jobs in sectors such as agriculture and health-
care, which it began during the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, 
it competes globally for the brightest and best in fields like 
technology. But automation is expensive, the advanced tech-
nologies are unevenly distributed across the EU, and some of 
the new systems rely on technologies and materials that are 
difficult to get. The EU’s northern member states and large 
cities press ahead with this two-pronged approach, rolling 
out smart city models. But member states in the EU’s south 
– in particular, poor rural regions – struggle as they have no 
means to sustain their agricultural or tourist sectors. 
Smuggling networks come to straddle Europe’s external 
border and the buffers the EU has created across North 
Africa, feeding the labor needs of Europe’s southern mem-
bers. The Italian government treats these organized crime 
groups in much the same way as Germany and the Nether-
lands treat MNCs – as businesses that control the transfer 
of migrants into the EU and then out again. Scared of losing 
access to remittances and being stuck with large numbers 
of unemployed young men, African elites push their nation-
als northward. These young people cannot avail themselves 
of their right to work in regional free movement zones like 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
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because of the vicious traffickers and people smugglers who 
spirit them across the Mediterranean. As the EU defends 
its borders, it becomes less attractive for global migration. 
China fully capitalizes on Europe’s reputational failure and 
takes an even more excessive approach to African elites.
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
In this scenario for 2030, the EU had the potential to cre-
ate a much more integrated European labor market than it 
has today. This is significant because many of the migration 
problems that the EU currently faces – related to both at-
tracting global labor and absorbing irregular migration flows 
– arise from its lack of one. The EU is highly unusual in that 
it has a border-free travel area, the Schengen Area, at the 
heart of its migration, visa, and border policy. The contin-
ued absence of a truly European labor market meant it could 
attract migrants neither on the basis of an assessment of its 
combined needs, nor by offering prospective high-skilled 
migrants access to a cohesive market of 214 million workers. 
This absence also meant that its member states were affect-
ed by migration shocks in highly asymmetric ways as irreg-
ular migrants used the EU’s border-free travel area to pick 
and choose between 27 different national labor markets. But 
in this scenario, despite the changed circumstances, the EU 
maintained its Schengen-style siege mentality rather than 
capitalizing on a more integrated labor market.
Then as now, the EU pictured itself at the center of a vast 
regional (labor) market that stretches into the Caucasus, 
Levant, Horn of Africa, and Gulf of Guinea. But it developed 
no means of absorbing these migrants. In this scenario, the 
EU retained the same approach to migrants – one that is 
not based on their long-term integration into the Europe-
an labor force but rather on the short-term mobility made 
possible by the Schengen Area. (In the words of one of the 
experts at our scenario workshop, the message to migrants 
is: “Give us your labor then kindly leave again.”) As this ap-
proach failed and migrants stayed on, the EU resorted to 
the same pattern of defensive buffering arrangements as 
under the current Schengen Area: it made deals with elites, 
simultaneously reducing their legitimacy and its ability to 
drive cooperation. Whether through a buffering deal on the 
territory of Niger or support to Nigeria to strengthen its 
borders, the EU undermined the efforts by ECOWAS and 
the African Union (AU) to create integrated free movement 
zones that might train and retain African labor. Its fears be-
came self-fulfilling as migrants fled oppressive regimes and 
had nowhere to go but Europe.
WORST CASE SCENARIO: MIGRATION 
AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
The EU finds itself as just one of a number of regional migra-
tion zones with countries in Southeast Asia clubbing together 
in order to retain labor. This takes on geopolitical and ideo-
logical tones as migration becomes a geo-economic tool in the 
competition among these blocs. The EU struggles to find its 
place in this new global order and misses the opportunity to 
reach out to migration regimes in Africa to create multilater-
al rules. It ends up positioning the European free movement 
zone as a kind of civilizational space, leading to a hard border 
to its south – and a surge of irregular immigration.
The EU Concentrates on Competition from the Indo-Pacific
A new regional labor zone forms in the Indo-Pacific that 
is initially spurred by China. After the COVID-19 pandem-
ic, China reshores production, stockpiles strategic supplies 
of raw materials, and massively invests in domestic educa-
tion, but – due to its historical one-child policy – it lacks 
the population to fill its domestic production jobs. Conse-
quently, it is soaking up migrants from neighboring coun-
tries, whom it houses in poor conditions in large suburban 
migrant centers. In response, a core of five ASEAN mem-
bers begins cooperating more deeply on intra-regional mi-
gration in a bid to retain local labor. Led by Vietnam, whose 
own youth bulge has been curtailed by large-scale emigra-
tion to China, this grouping also consists of Cambodia and 
Laos, two further states with historically high youth unem-
ployment, as well as Singapore and Thailand, two with an 
ageing population. In this context, migration soon becomes 
an ideological tool for these Asian governments – part of 
the regional effort to counterbalance China and build a 
shared political affinity. Vietnam rebrands the initiative as 
a “people’s front” against Chinese assertiveness, a framing 
that attracts the United States. Migration and free move-
ment have become tools in a new Cold War.
The EU Misses an Opportunity for Multilateral Cooperation
Fearing a bipolar global migration system as Chinese and 
American-led blocs view the ability to attract and retain mi-
gration as a matter of geo-economic necessity and prestige, 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) begins work to 
link up regional labor markets and border regimes, including 
ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop-
ment (IGAD) in Africa. Four lead states are named – Morocco, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey – which form a belt around 
the world and sit at the crossroads between regions. At talks 
in Cancun, the four express the hope that this inter-regional 
cooperation will be the basis for a binding multilateral migra-
Building European Resilience and Capacity to Act: Lessons for 2030
48 No. 13 | July 2021
REPORT
tion order. But the EU is nervous of being tied to migration 
rules, fearing that AU negotiators will oblige it to take in mi-
grants. It also views efforts by the AU and ECOWAS to create 
African “free movement zones” as being more about lifting 
borders to allow migrants to move northward to Europe 
rather than creating well-regulated labor markets. In a world 
in which migration has become a vector of grand ideologies, 
the EU views itself increasingly as a “civilizational area.” It 
pursues bilateral buffering deals with Turkey and Morocco 
to cut off the flow of migrants from the south.
Southern Migration Spikes
Despite its role as a lead state in the multilateral talks, Mo-
rocco is primarily interested in currying favor in West Af-
rica. It clearly sees the ideological and geopolitical uses of 
migration and gleefully capitalizes on the way the EU has 
rebuffed the ILO’s efforts. The Moroccan regime in Rabat 
turns away from the EU and applies to join the AU’s policy 
to create an African passport area. This, plus its effort to ac-
cede to the ECOWAS free movement area, effectively push-
es the continent’s outer border to within a few kilometers 
of Spain. Morocco’s king is playing geopolitics and liberalizes 
the country’s treatment of migrants, in particular those with 
an affinity to France, in a bid to literally play kingmaker be-
tween West Africa’s Francophone and Anglophone states. But 
he has overreached. Regional powers like Nigeria and Côte 
d’Ivoire now compete to assert their own pet regional blocs, 
and they start using their diasporas as geopolitical tools. So-
cial discontent inside Morocco at the favorable treatment of 
immigrants has already led to violent confrontations; in turn, 
their countries of origin take offence and stir up discontent 
with the king. As Morocco crumbles, disorderly migration in 
the Mediterranean begins to spike.
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
This worst-case scenario underlined the fact that there is no 
inherent link between the EU’s policies to compete for glob-
al migration and the spike in migration across the Mediterra-
nean. Competition with other regional labor markets played 
out in this scenario not in the battle to attract migrant labor, 
but rather to retain local labor and build up regional labor 
mobility. That meant that the EU did not need to open itself 
up to global migration to remain competitive – global com-
petition was motivated by ideological and geopolitical, rather 
than economic, reasons. Indeed, the EU used the competi-
tion as grounds to close itself off from migrant labor. That in-
dicated that the EU does not always need to open up to labor 
to remain competitive. But it also showed that, under entire-
ly different conditions than in the status quo scenario, the 
EU somehow triggered the same outcome – large-scale mi-
gration from Africa. This strongly suggested that there is no 
given link between the need to compete against other labor 
markets and the risk of attracting large-scale migration from 
Africa – rather, large-scale irregular migration resulted from 
poorly-conceived EU policies.
In terms of opportunities, this scenario serves as a remind-
er that regional labor markets form in order to retain local 
labor as much as to attract labor from outside. While this 
was as true of regional groupings in Africa as it was of the 
European Union, the EU did not take this eventuality seri-
ously and support the emergence of integrated African la-
bor regimes. Europe’s skepticism about Africa’s capacity to 
retain labor was not only expressed in the buffering poli-
cies it put in place toward African regions that were based 
on the assumption that their free-movement regimes ex-
ist more de facto than de jure; but it was also expressed in 
well-meaning policies to reduce the cost of remitting mon-
ey from the EU to Africa, which incentivized African states 
to push their nationals toward the EU. It is also a remind-
er that grand geopolitical and ideological imperatives affect 
how regions deal with migration. This was the case during 
the Cold War and in the market ideology of the past two 
decades. The EU cannot build regional migration regimes in 
West Africa if it does not understand regional issues, for ex-
ample, those of prestige between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. 
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BEST-CASE SCENARIO: MULTIPOLAR 
DEVELOPMENT BREAKS THE MIGRATION 
DEADLOCK
In this scenario, the EU successfully boosts its attractiveness 
as a labor destination, yet it loses its relative attractiveness 
in its near abroad. On a global level, China has gone into de-
mographic decline and is struggling to attract skilled labor. 
This leaves the EU well placed to compete. But in other world 
regions, developing economies have become better at cooper-
ating to retain labor. The EU is slow to realize that it is not 
the natural destination for Africans, but when it does, irregu-
lar migration across the Mediterranean dips. 
Competition from China Fizzles Out
China is ageing fast and reverses its policy of sending its 
nationals abroad as security and infrastructure advisors. 
Signs of instability at home, where young unmarried men 
are agitated about “growing old before they grow rich,” 
mean Beijing is focused on domestic affairs. In Africa, the 
Chinese presence remains little more than an outpost in 
Djibouti, where Chinese “peacekeepers” are a focal point 
for locals who, fueled by the tacit support of the Turkish 
secret services and Qatari moneymen, express their anger 
at the treatment of Uyghurs. As China withdraws, it trig-
gers upheaval between the Horn’s regional rivals. Displace-
ment grows, exacerbated by climate-induced crop failure. 
The EU, now easily outcompeting “Fortress China” for the 
attractiveness of its labor market, frets about a wave of ir-
regular migration from the region. It offers a mix of de-
velopment, humanitarian, diplomatic, and trade initiatives 
– online learning in refugee camps, a resettlement scheme 
for refugees that takes their academic qualifications and 
professional aptitude into account, and a set of “mobility 
partnerships” for Ethiopians to work in Europe, all of which 
are tied to obligations on the government to hold back the 
flow of people.
A New Khartoum Process
Ethiopia insists on taking the issue to IGAD, the eight-coun-
try East African trade bloc. There, the Sudanese warn the 
EU that its new attractiveness will draw people northward, 
putting a burden on Sudan and threatening to tip the deli-
cate balance of relations with other countries on the route 
to Europe. They call for a reinvigoration of the “Khartoum 
Process,” the old EU-brokered dialogue between a string of 
countries on the migration trail to the Mediterranean that 
accepted money and limited access to European visas in 
return for acting as buffers. But Ethiopian diplomats push 
back at this scaremongering: The EU is not, in fact, an at-
tractive market for local workers, so why change that? That 
string of countries down to Tunisia – Anglophone and Fran-
cophone, majority Christian and Muslim – can instead be 
useful with expertise to overcome the Horn’s border ten-
sions and build up the regional labor market regime; and 
the EU can be helpful in lending IGAD diplomatic weight so 
that locals gain access to and humanitarian support from 
the genuinely attractive regional labor markets of ECOWAS 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Europeans Begin Working Toward a More Multipolar 
Global Migration Regime
For European negotiators accustomed to thinking of the 
EU as one of – if not the – major global destination for all 
kinds of migrants, such straight talk from the Ethiopians is 
a wake-up call. Addis Ababa warns that if the EU returns to 
its familiar mix of African migration policies – the limited 
offer of access to the EU labor market coupled with buff-
ering deals – it will create the same old toxic effect, namely 
new migration dependencies between Africa and the EU as 
well as the smuggling networks to service them. The mes-
sage comes just in time: the EU had been preparing to pull 
development support from southern Africa and plow it back 
into buffering arrangements in Niger; it had been about to 
start using its crisis-management missions to post Euro-
pean border experts at the Libyan border; and it was work-
ing out how to leverage a new round of regional trade talks 
for migration conditionality. That is not to say that the EU 
ceases migration conditionality but, rather than creating 
buffering deals, it uses its trade and aid to cajole the mem-
bers of IGAD to cooperate in good faith on regional migra-
tion opportunities. 
Stocktaking: Lessons Learned from 2030
The key breakthrough in this scenario was the realization 
that regional labor markets, even in Africa, were capable of 
cohering and retaining labor. On a global level, the old dis-
tinction between countries of origin and countries of desti-
nation – between the Global South and Global North – were 
shrinking. In the wake of the global financial crisis, wealth 
and influence had seeped away from the United States and 
EU, and these wealthy labor markets lost their absolute at-
tractiveness. Almost all states became countries of immi-
gration, emigration, and transit. Thus, they found more on 
which to cooperate – rapprochement that played out most 
intensely at the regional level. In this scenario, the EU was 
able to help African states to cooperate on border control 
and immigration as soon as it stopped behaving as if they 
were all solely countries of emigration. These new African 
regional labor markets not only retained local workers and 
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boosted the stock of human capital, but they also attract-
ed outsiders. From inside the EU itself, even in the Neth-
erlands and Germany, young Europeans pressed their 
governments to secure them opportunities to move abroad 
to attractive regional labor markets in the old Global South. 
As illustrated in the other two scenarios, countries of the 
“Global Middle” such as Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and 
Mexico were perhaps the first to feel this shift. They had 
gone from countries of origin to countries of transit to 
countries of destination; and they had tried to diversify away 
from the European Union, United States, or wealthy South 
Asian economies and use migration relations to access 
emerging local regional economies like ECOWAS or IGAD. 
Inside the EU, we can imagine that the EU’s eastern and 
southeastern member states were key to the EU’s own reas-
sessment of the situation. Their recent experience of migra-
tion has been very different than that of the “old” member 
states – their nationals moved abroad in large numbers in 
the mid-2000s and often landed in poorly recognized roles. 
They experienced the divisiveness of mobility and of large 
populations that chose not to be mobile, and they were left 
with national problems. They also took the lead in the EU 
when it came to diaspora policy, finding ways to open up 
good emigration opportunities for their nationals and seeing 
that “circular migration” and “mobility partnerships” could 
apply to EU citizens going to attractive third countries just 
as much as to immigrants coming into the EU. 
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